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DEFERRED PROSECUTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO INVESTIGATION AND REFORM  
  
Lawrence A. Cunningham* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 When evaluating how to proceed against a corporate investigative target, law 
enforcement authorities often ignore the target’s governance arrangements, while subsequently 
negotiating or imposing governance requirements, especially in deferred prosecution 
agreements. Ignoring governance structures and processes amid investigation can be hazardous 
and implementing improvised reforms afterwards may have severe unintended consequences—
particularly when prescribing standardized governance devices. Drawing, in part, on new 
lessons from three prominent cases—Arthur Andersen, AIG and Bristol-Myers Squibb—this 
Article criticizes prevailing discord and urges prosecutors to contemplate corporate governance 
at the outset and to articulate rationales for prescribed changes. Integrating the role of 
corporate governance into prosecutions would promote public confidence in prosecutorial 
decisions to broker firm-specific governance reforms currently lacking and increase their 
effectiveness. The Article, therefore, contributes a novel perspective on the controversial 
practice: though substantial commentary urges prosecutors to avoid intruding into corporate 
governance, this Article explains the importance of prosecutors investing in it.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Prosecutors in the boardroom” is a slogan reflecting an unintended early 21st century 
overlap of corporate governance and corporate criminal liability.1 Although exaggerated, the 
phrase reflects how prosecutors increasingly demand corporate governance reforms when 
settling criminal cases using deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs).2 While a growing body of 
scholarship seeks to put governance beyond the purview of prosecutors, ousting prosecutors 
from the boardroom,3 this Article explains why prosecutors should consider governance 
carefully in determining how to proceed ex ante and articulate rationales for governance changes 
in DPAs ex post.  
Prosecutorial failure to consider governance ex ante can have adverse consequences, 
including activating governance mechanisms not designed to the purpose and imposing on 
corporate actors to hastily adopt changes that they would ordinarily evaluate and debate 
dispassionately.4 Subsequent prosecutorial prescriptions of governance changes are rarely the 
product of articulated rationales and can seem like ad hoc ransoms or trophies created on the fly 
by prosecutors seeking to claim victory. Irreconcilable criticisms result, with many observers 
saying that DPAs are coerced extractions of overzealous prosecutors while others say they are 
mere whitewash that let corporate crooks off the hook.5    
Prosecutors should publicly articulate the rationales for the governance changes they 
propose ex post and that articulation should be based on their assessment of the target’s 
governance profile ex ante. Creating such an ex ante profile would involve modest incremental 
costs while improving the quality of prosecutorial decisions on how to proceed with a case—
such as whether to seek an indictment, what charges to bring, or whether to settle, and on what 
terms. Subsequent articulation of rationales would add substantial systemic benefits by 
increasing rationality, building credibility, deflecting criticism and creating a catalogue of 
knowledge useful in future prosecutions, regulation and governance design. This Article thus 
parts with critics of prosecutors in the boardroom by explaining the value of prosecutorial 
investment in corporate governance.        
Part I of this Article first defines the concept of corporate governance—with notes on the 
governance of other business forms—and then highlights the most important developments of 
the corporate governance movement of the past two generations, distinguishing those features 
from compliance. While critics allow room for prosecutors to consider compliance in the 
                                                 
1 It also inspired a book title. PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE 
CONDUCT (Anthony Barkow & Rachel Barkow eds., 2011). 
2 See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007); Leonard Orland, The 
Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45 (2006). 
3 E.g., Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Deterring Crime Without Prosecutor 
Interference in Corporate Governance (2011), in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 1; see also Miriam 
Hechler Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 578 (2012) (exploring reasons why ex post prosecution rather 
than ex ante regulation may occur and suggesting that the effects may leave society worse off).  
4 See Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in Business Crime 
Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23, 32-58 (2010); see also Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1613 (2007). 
5 Compare Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2006) with Ralph 
Nader & Robert Weissman, Letter to Alberto Gonzales (June 5, 2006), available at 
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/editorsblog/?p=30 (July 6, 2006, 15:34 EST) (discussing DPA with Boeing).  
The truth, undoubtedly, is somewhere in between.  
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exercise of their discretion, this preliminary discussion stresses the importance of addressing 
governance, not merely compliance. The well-known story of the 2002 prosecution of the 
venerable accounting firm of Arthur Andersen is invoked to illustrate the underappreciated 
importance of governance. Many take the lesson of Andersen’s destruction by indictment to 
warn against indicting large business organizations. Part I, in contrast, draws the seminal lesson 
of Andersen: the prudence of prosecutorial consideration of governance when deciding how to 
proceed against a business.  
Part II presents an original account of a more obscure but richer story: the 2005 
prosecutorial probe into AIG.  This explains how AIG’s culpability at the center of the financial 
crisis of late 2008 was propelled by prosecutorial failure to evaluate its corporate governance 
realities in 2005. Analysis reveals concern that prosecutors fail to appreciate how formal 
uniformity in corporate governance regulation masks considerable substantive variation and how 
this failure can be costly.  
Part III turns conceptual and analytical to explore the relationship between prosecutors 
and corporate governance, particularly the proper scope of DPAs. One approach, implicitly 
reflected in the status quo, conceives of DPAs as pure contract whose terms are limited only by 
standard contract doctrine; a mirror-image conception, critical of current practice, conceives of 
DPAs as pure regulation, which limits the range of proper terms to those targeting compliance, 
prohibiting broader aspects of corporate governance. A third conception, the most apt, 
recognizes DPAs as products of prosecutorial discretion, subject to prosecutorial restraint. In this 
view, DPAs warrant an integrated approach covering a wide range of terms, including 
governance terms, subject to prudential restrictions: prosecutors should only proffer such terms 
when they have assembled a formal governance profile of a target ex ante and publicly explain 
the rationale for such terms when announcing DPAs ex post. Benefits and costs are hypothesized 
and assessed, lending support to the integrated approach.6 
Part IV returns to concrete ground to offer a series of examples of governance terms 
found in DPAs and credible rationales that prosecutors might have articulated. Examples include 
terms from the DPA in the case of Bristol-Myers Squibb, which drew sharp criticism, but 
prosecutors subsequently published a detailed explanation,7 illustrating the articulated rationale 
this Article prescribes. Appendices excerpt governance terms of the Bristol-Myers Squibb DPA 
and related prosecutorial explanations, not so much to assert their optimality or ideality, but to 
suggest the feasibility of fulfilling this Article’s prescriptions at reasonably low cost with 
valuable payoffs.     
This Article concludes that the Department of Justice should lead by updating its 
guidelines for federal prosecutions of corporate targets to reflect the integrated approach and 
other prosecutors follow the lead.  The DOJ has been reluctant to publish guidance on the subject 
of corporate governance reforms in DPAs.8 But this Article urges steps that should be more 
                                                 
6 Costs are discussed infra text accompanying notes 218-221. 
7 Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of Good Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 43 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1043 (2006). 
8 Compare Written Testimony of Brandon L. Garrett, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Deferred Prosecution: Should Corporate Settlement 
Agreements Be Without Guidelines? (March 11, 2008) (calling for DOJ to adopt clearer rules or guidance on 
corporate governance aspects of DPAs) with DOJ Letter to House Subcommittee (2008) (stating that “performance 
measures” in DPAs may be examined over time). 
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congenial. The first is to add corporate governance as a factor to the existing list of factors 
prosecutors are told to consider when evaluating how to proceed with a case.9 The other, only 
slightly lengthier, would direct prosecutors to relate proffered governance reforms to that 
consideration in public articulations of their reasoning.   
Looking at the same group of about 300 DPAs now in existence, those who seek to oust 
prosecutors from the boardroom see frequent and extensive incursions into corporate governance 
that must be repelled while those who perceive excessive leniency are eager for greater 
prosecutorial inroads into governance. Under the integrated approach, the exact DPA population 
or density of governance terms becomes less important than whether there is investigation ahead 
of time and an articulated rationale afterwards.   
 
I.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ARTHUR ANDERSEN 
 
Prosecutors must appreciate both the variety of corporate governance, and the varying 
governance regimes across different forms of business organization, when deciding how to 
proceed in a criminal case against a business and when settling.10 Instead, they talk in sweeping 
vague terms about rehabilitation of corporate cultures—for example, from a “culture of 
corruption or criminality” to a “culture of compliance.”11 This Part defines corporate 
governance; highlights the achievements and shortcomings of the corporate governance 
movement of the past two generations; and distinguishes governance from compliance. It 
concludes by drawing a new lesson from an old story: the 2002 federal indictment of Arthur 
Andersen does not necessarily stand for the idea that prosecutors should refrain from indicting 
large businesses because doing so presents adverse collateral consequences for innocent 
parties.12 Rather, the seminal lesson is that prosecutors made the mistake of failing to assess or 
understand Arthur Andersen and its governance; had they been more careful, they would not 
have indicted the firm. 
 
A. Definition and Variability 
 
Corporate governance is a capacious notion applicable to any business organization, 
encompassing business purpose and the mechanisms within a firm to achieve it. Purposes vary 
across companies and any given one may have multiple purposes. A common purpose in the 
United States for publicly-traded companies is to maximize stock price and for all companies to 
maximize net profits available for distribution to owners. Some companies, such as Ben & 
Jerry’s Ice Cream, adopt policies more geared to promoting social objectives, while others, such 
                                                 
9 See infra notes 68 & 264 and accompanying text.  
10 The popular press portrayed prosecutors as anemic in failing to charge individuals or firms with crimes arising out 
of the financial crisis of 2008. E.g., Editorial, No Crime, No Punishment, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2012). Prosecutors 
explained that abstinence was not for lack of power but for lack of evidence, with both the DOJ and the SEC noting 
that they had conducted in-depth an unhindered investigation into numerous firms, including Goldman Sachs.  
11 See Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1417 (2009); BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS TAKE ON CORPORATIONS ch. 3 
(forthcoming 2013) (draft manuscript on file with author and cited with permission);  U.S. Attorney, District of New 
Jersey, Press Release, Wright Medical (October 5, 2012) (boasting of inducing target to “implement a compliant 
corporate culture”). 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 72-89. 
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as Johnson & Johnson, state corporate purpose as advancing the interests of a list of stakeholders 
in given orders, such as customers, employees, communities and shareholders.13 Greater 
variation appears among non-U.S. companies.14 
Organizational arrangements bearing on the pursuit of business purpose address the board 
of directors, officers, employees and owners.15 Terms concern board size and procedures and 
director selection and identity; officer functions and reporting protocols and leadership attitudes 
and philosophies; and employee training and organizational policies and procedures. Features 
include shareholder demographics, such as the degree of ownership by institutional investors and 
individual investors; and the firm’s directors, officers and employees. They also include the 
characteristics of any controlling shareholder and whether a firm is publicly-traded. 
Further delineation of an overall governance profile reaches matters of employee 
compensation and morale as well as internal controls, including compliance with law. A 
corporation’s regulatory environment can be important too, especially for firms in highly-
regulated industries where criminal prosecution—or even indictment—can expose firms to 
debarment from government contracts or licenses. Within this framework, governance may 
encompass how professional advisors such as auditors and lawyers are recruited, supervised and 
paid. Among a potpourri of other attributes of governance are such topics as charitable giving, 
political speech and CEO succession. Finally, the subjects of financial reporting and disclosure 
are also critical aspects of corporate governance for publicly-traded companies. 
Corporate governance therefore includes a wide variety of features. They may be 
products of norms, practices, history, culture, contract, bylaw, charter, regulation or statute. 
Some features are definite, observable and changeable by law or bargain, such as the type and 
number of directors and how employees are trained and paid. Others are more fluid, intangible 
and persistent, such as a tone at the top, employee culture and shareholder apathy or activism. 
Given such variety within companies, corporate governance changes have vastly different effects 
on each company.   
Although corporate governance literally denominates governance of the corporate form 
of business organization, the concepts and issues apply to other forms of business organization as 
well—including partnerships, limited liability companies and others. Ownership and control and 
related governance attributes in those forms vary further. For example, partnerships tend to 
involve a greater degree of participation in management among the partners and partner capital 
investments consist of skills and reputation as well as money. 
Understanding what makes a given business organization tick requires a rudimentary 
grasp of such governance attributes, including an appreciation that what works for one enterprise 
may or may not work for another. As important, developments in the broader field of business 
law in recent generations have emanated from the corporate form, especially those associated 
with the corporate governance movement.   
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics by Modern Publicly Held 
Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1625 (1993). 
14 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate 
Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133 (1999). 
15 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1994). 
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B. Movement and Power Shifts 
 
Beginning in the 1970s, a corporate governance movement emerged to contend that 
corporations should maximize shareholder value. Proponents advocated devices adapted to that 
end focused on the role of officers, directors and shareholders. Until then, during most of the 20th 
century in America, boards of directors tended to be characterized as a collegial body operating 
in an atmosphere of trust and informality.16 Largely for reasons of historical and political 
accident, managers were strong, directors supportive and shareholders, especially in publicly-
traded firms, weak.17 This structure was famously described in the 1930s by Berle and Means as 
resulting in the separation of corporate ownership from corporate control.18 
The corporate governance movement, along with a burgeoning scholarly literature, 
forged change in the traditional model in the 1970s. Demand for change rose due to a 
combination of social, business and legal factors, including corporate scandals that alienated 
shareholders, and judicial and regulatory reformers eager for change.19 For shareholder 
advocates, the original goal of this movement was to focus corporations on the purpose of 
maximizing shareholder value; in the legal literature, the objective was expressed in terms of 
reducing agency costs associated with the separation of ownership from control in publicly-
traded corporations.20  Other proponents stressed broader concerns about civic responsibility.21 
Institutional Investors. The most significant development in the modern history of 
corporate governance has been the rise in institutional ownership of corporate stock.22 Since the 
1970s, with increasing ownership through today, a steadily growing percentage of the equity of 
large U.S. corporations has come to be owned not by individuals, as historically occurred, but by 
institutional investors, such as pension plans, private foundations and mutual funds.23 These 
institutional investors drove the corporate governance movement. 
With vast pools of capital, along with associated votes in corporate director elections, 
concentrated in fewer hands, shareholders gained greater influence in corporate boardrooms. In 
particular, institutional shareholders held out the promise of overcoming the costs of collective 
action and the problem of rational apathy that plagued individual shareholders and limited their 
power.24  
Active shareholders—such as the California Public Employees Retirement System or 
CalPers—succeeded in transforming many aspects of corporate governance. Watershed 
accomplishments include the landmark amendments to the federal proxy rules in 1993 that 
                                                 
16 See MYLES MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971). 
17 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE 
FINANCE (1996). 
18 ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
19 See MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976). 
20 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996). 
21 E.g., ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1991). 
22 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Embattled CEO, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 987 (2011). 
23 See Gary J. Previts, A Pie Chart View of US Publicly Traded Corporate Equity Distribution: 1950-2011 (slide 
show presentation on file with the author); see also Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder 
Primacy (draft manuscript 2012, available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2079607). 
24 Directors began to pay more attention to shareholder “voice,” offering shareholders an alternative to the only 
traditional way to object to disappointed expectations, which was to “exit,” meaning to sell the stock (once called 
the Wall Street rule). Cf. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINES IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
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improved the ability of such investors to communicate with one another and plan coordinated 
campaigns to advance their corporate governance agendas.25 Further manifestations include 
increased frequency and adoption of shareholder proposals addressed to governance rather than 
social issues and expanding shareholder access to the corporation’s own proxy statement for the 
election of directors (so-called “proxy access”).26  Such shareholders also campaigned for 
specific corporate governance devices, such as prohibiting the same person from serving as both 
board chairman and CEO, holding executive sessions of the board attended solely by outsiders 
and imposing age limits for directors.  
Outside Directors. But the single greatest consequence of the rise of institutional 
shareholders—and the other most significant achievement of the corporate governance 
movement—has been the consequent rise in the number and power of outside directors—those 
not otherwise employed by or associated with the corporation.27 Outside directors were seen as a 
mechanism for monitoring management and therefore reducing agency costs.28 They promised a 
unique ability to render independent judgments and promote shareholder value.29  
Reinforcing the institutional investor appetite for outside directors, laws and regulations 
also increased their number and power. State corporation law in the 1980s encouraged boards to 
have outside directors, especially for tasks such as evaluating takeovers and other transactions 
posing conflicts of interest.30 In federal securities law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 expanded 
the power of outside directors, concerning the auditing function, including giving outside 
directors plenary power over the company’s auditor.31 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 created 
similar requirements concerning compensation committees.32 As a result of institutional 
shareholder preferences for outside directors and regulatory enthusiasm, today’s boards of the 
largest publicly-traded corporations often have no more than one or two inside (management) 
directors.33 
                                                 
25 See Jill A. Hornstein, Proxy Solicitation Redefined: The SEC Takes an Incremental Step Toward Effective 
Corporate Governance, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 1129 (1993). 
26 See Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEO, supra note 22; Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy 
Access, 61 EMORY L. J. 435 (2012); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259 
(2009). 
27 See Ronald J. Gilson, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
863 (1991). The concepts of outside and inside directors are vernacular terms whose precise definitions vary with 
context but the distinction generally is between directors who are employees of a company (inside) and those who 
are not (outside). More particular distinctions attempt to define a notion of “independent” to denominate directors 
whose lack of employee or other  corporate status enable them to exercise judgments free of conflict of interest. 
Specific and varying definitions of director independence appear in such authorities as the federal securities laws, 
state corporation laws, stock exchange rules, corporate and board committee charters, corporate contracts and 
various law reform documents. See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Outside Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
73 (2007). 
28 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: Institutional Investors as Monitors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1191 
(1991). 
29 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value 
and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). 
30 E.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A. 
2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); DEL. GEN. 
CORP. L. § 144; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, § 8.61. 
31 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301. 
32 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111-203), § 952; see also S.E.C. Rue 
10C-1(b)(1)) (implementing the statutory directives as required).   
33 See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127 (2010). 
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Gatekeepers. The third most significant development of the corporate governance 
movement concerned the role of professional advisors, called gatekeepers. These are participants 
in corporate process, traditionally auditors and lawyers, who stake their reputation when 
vouching for the validity or integrity of corporate decision-making.34 In financial reporting, for 
instance, auditors attest to the truth and fairness of accounting results, and in raising capital, 
lawyers conduct due diligence to assure the legality of the offering and veracity of the issuer’s 
descriptions in accompanying offering documents.35 Though such professionals had been 
involved in these transactions throughout the prior century, the corporate governance movement 
amplified the importance of their role.36 In a recent trend, outside directors have retained their 
own lawyers to represent them. Historically, outside directors had not hired their own lawyers, 
but Sarbanes-Oxley authorized audit committees to do so.37 A specialty legal practice emerged: 
representing outside directors, especially advising on disagreements with chief executives.38  
 Shortcomings. There are several shortcomings in these corporate governance 
developments. First, it is not always clear that the rise of institutional investors or outside 
directors reduced agency costs as much as promised or that many of the other devices do so 
consistently. Institutional investors, after all, manage money for others, meaning they are agents 
as well for their investors, and those investors face the costs of having those agents manage their 
money. The rise in power of institutional investors may have reduced one set of agency costs 
while creating another set in its place. Debate contested the net effects.39 Further, institutional 
investors are not homogenous, but vary in such features as relative activism or passivity and 
goals, with most stressing shareholder value but many engaging in “socially responsible 
investing” that addresses varied objectives such as environmental protection or human rights.40 
Concerning outside directors, empirical research never provided much evidence that their 
presence improves shareholder value or corporate performance.41 Some evidence suggests that 
                                                 
34 Reiner H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & 
STRATEGY 53 (1986). 
35 See Lawrence A. Cunningham. Sharing Accounting’s Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron’s Dark Shadows, 57 
BUS. LAW. 1421 (2002). 
36 See Abraham J. Briloff, The Corporate Society: We are In Pari Delicto, 1 J. CORP. L. 457 (1976); Lincoln Savings 
& Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (Sporkin, J.)  Evidence of the importance attached to 
the gatekeeping function is clear from the expanding list of professionals who can provide such a service, which 
today includes rating agencies, research analysts, D&O insurers and investment banks. See CLAIRE A. HILL & BRETT 
H. MCDONNELL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (2012) (including pieces about 
such gatekeepers by Lawrence A. Cunningham, Jill E. Fisch, Tamar Frankel, Sean J. Griffith, Richard W. Painter 
and Frank Partnoy).  
37 Proposals to equip outside directors with power to retain independent advisors remained rare even after being 
ordained in 1994 by the American Law Institute. ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 3.04 (1994); see 
also James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors with 
Independent Counsel, 48 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1077 (2003) (making “modest” proposal that outside directors asked 
to approve interested transactions of other directors retain their own lawyer). 
38 Among the earliest and most prominent examples of outside lawyers exerting power in the boardroom to oust a 
chief executive occurred when Ira Millstein, of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, played that role in 1992’s dismissal of 
General Motors CEO Robert Stempel. See John A. Byrne, The Guru of Good Governance, BUS. WK. (April 28, 
1997), p. 100; Alison Leigh Cowan, The High-Energy Board Room, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 1992). 
39 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 
811 (1992). 
40 See CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 87 (1997). 
41  E.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
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what matters is not so much a board’s independence as its active engagement.42  There is also 
evidence that certain kinds of outside directors improve the performance of certain functions, 
such as adherence to accounting requirements.43 But, clearly, there is a trade-off between the 
expertise commanded by inside (management) directors and the independence that outside 
directors offer.44  
Debate continues over the exact value of gatekeepers and ways to improve their 
effectiveness.45 An acute case concerns the new practice of outside directors retaining 
independent counsel to advise them, especially on disagreements with management.  Some 
experts see this development as perilous, as it cleaves boards into factions, injects lawyers deeply 
into corporate deliberations and compromises the independence of directors when lawyers advise 
them of what is best for them personally rather than one is best for the corporation.46 However, 
in some cases outside directors have assumed considerable power and authority in corporate 
boardrooms and have been exposed to personal liability—most notably in the cases of Enron and 
WorldCom.47 
Studies and debate concerning corporate governance features correctly suggest that any 
given governance reform, from adding outside directors to having the audit committee supervise 
outside auditors, could have differing effects from company to company.48 Such differences 
expose a final weakness about the corporate governance movement: it often advanced reforms 
for adoption generally that overlooked variation among companies.49 That has been especially 
problematic concerning governance devices adopted in the aftermath of corporate scandal.50     
Despite broad observable phenomena such as the rise of institutional investors or outside 
directors and changeable terms such as the staffing and duties of audit committees, there remains 
considerable variation in relevant corporate governance attributes at particular companies.  Thus 
boards may be required—by law, stock exchange rule or shareholder mandate—to produce 
governance guidelines, committee charters or ethics codes, but the resulting products and effects 
                                                                                                                                                             
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. 
Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POLICY  REV. April 2003), at 7. 
42 See Ira Millstein & Paul MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Improved Performance of the Large 
Publicly-Traded Corporation, Yale School of Management Working Paper No. 49 (1997).   
43 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the Empirical Literature, 77 
CINCINNATI L. REV. 465 (2008). 
44 Id.; Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447 (2008). 
45 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: FAILURE AND REFORM (2006). 
46 See, e.g.,  E. Norman Veasey, Separate and Continuing Counsel for Independent Directors: An Idea Whose Time 
Has Not Come as a General Practice, 59 1413 (2004); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New 
Player in the Boardroom: The Emergence of the Independent Directors’ Counsel, 59 BUS. LAW. 1389 (2004) 
(offering tepid acceptance of the concept).  
47 See infra text accompanying notes 66-70. 
48 See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the Unintended 
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001); Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 (1997). 
49 See Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984 (1993).  
50 See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 
1521 (2005); Larry Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUSTON L. REV. 77 (2003); Stuart Banner, What Causes Securities 
Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 849 (1997). This literature addresses generally-applicable 
laws and regulations adopted in response to financial crises, not the individualized setting of DPAs, which differs, as 
noted infra text accompanying notes 203-204. 
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are unlikely to be identical at different firms.  Indeed, some governance regulations explicitly 
recognize that one size does not fit all, as when certain devices are required only of large 
companies and waived for smaller ones.51 
LLCs and LLPs. A final notable phenomenon in the development of business law in the 
past two generations has been the proliferation of alternative forms of business organization. The 
rise of the limited liability partnership and the limited liability company are the most prominent 
examples. These trace their origins to the limited partnership and the corporation, respectively, 
and are defined by the high degree to which investors in them may enjoy the benefits of limited 
liability along with other advantages. At one time, entrepreneurs had to accept trade-offs among 
alternative forms of business organization, such as between the limited shareholder liability of 
the corporate form that was subject to two levels of taxation or the single taxation of the 
partnership that exposed partners to unlimited liability. The rise of these alternative forms has 
eliminated such trade-offs, thanks to statutory and contractual innovations that combine the 
appealing attributes of historical forms of business organization into modern hybrids.52 
Governance features in these new forms of business organization are extensively tailored by 
contract and therefore even more variable than the traditional partnership and corporation.  
  
C. Compliance and the Rise of DPAs 
 
The subject of compliance is a narrow component of corporate governance with roots 
anchored not so much in the corporate governance movement but in the concurrent 
intensification of organizational criminal liability. Although corporate-level criminal liability 
was recognized in a famous 1909 case,53 throughout most of the 20th century, organizational 
criminal liability remained relatively rare. During the 1970s, however, an eruption of corporate 
scandals inspired law enforcement authorities to strengthen its policing of corporate behavior.54 
The Watergate-induced disclosures of corporate wrongdoing around the world by U.S. 
companies, such as the widespread bribery of foreign officials, prompted legislation cracking 
down on such practices.55 Congress strengthened criminal penalties under federal law across 
many fields, from antitrust to environmental to securities. Prosecutions ensued against 
corporations with household names, such as Drexel Burnham Lambert in finance and Exxon for 
the Valdez oil spill.56  
Compliance. The general approach held corporations vicariously liable for acts of their 
agents taken within the scope of employment.57 Policing corporate wrongdoing through criminal 
                                                 
51 E.g., Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989G, 103 Stat. 440 (2009) (dd-
Frank Act relieving internal control audit obligations for certain smaller public companies); Jumpstart Our Business 
Act (“JOBS Act”) of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §501, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
78l(g)(1)(A)). 
52 E.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2009). 
53 New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
54 John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of 
Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981).  
55 See Walter Perkel, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 40 AM. CRIM L. REV. 683 (2003). 
56 See DANIEL R. FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL 
REVOLUTION (1995). 
57 More sweeping variations were formulated as well. E.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st 
Cir. 1987) (collective knowledge standard: the sum total of employee knowledge across a corporation can be 
attributed to it). 
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law assumed a more formal dimension with the formation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 
1987 and the organizational sentencing guidelines it produced over the next few years.58 This 
codified an approach to deterring corporate crime through a calibrated sentencing format. It gave 
corporations credit in sentencing for having effective compliance programs in place as well as 
cooperating with lawmakers to conduct requisite investigations and assist in resulting 
prosecutions. This amounted to a slight shift from the traditional standard of vicarious liability to 
a modified duty-based approach to liability.59 That is, corporate exposure came to hinge on the 
relative effectiveness of a corporation’s compliance program.60 
The importance of effective compliance programs became more central to corporate life 
after 1996 when the Delaware Court of Chancery announced clear compliance duties of 
corporate directors.61 Drawing in part on the federal organizational sentencing guidelines, that 
opinion questioned the continuing soundness of a 1963 Delaware Supreme Court opinion that 
limited any such duties to cases where red flags would have stimulated a reasonable director’s 
attention.62 The Chancery opinion said that corporate directors must take reasonable efforts to 
assure that the firm maintains effective compliance programs, a stance later validated by the 
Delaware Supreme Court.63  
The holding was narrow and arose in the settlement of a derivative suit that required only 
assessing whether a settlement was fair. But it spawned extensive commentary and expanded 
work for consultants as companies scrutinized internal compliance programs.64 Scholars, 
meanwhile, questioned whether the preoccupation with compliance could produce cosmetic 
exercises in window dressing rather than substantive control over internal corporate agents.65 
After all, compliance systems—or governance structures—are rarely effective unless both senior 
management and individuals responsible for maintaining them believe in and endorse them. 
Employees and other constituents pick up on signals about whether management holds such 
commitments or is merely going through the motions. 
Enforcement Intensity and Andersen. The era of Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley brought 
renewed intensity to corporate criminal law, just as it did to corporate governance.66 Sarbanes-
Oxley, enacted in 2002, defined new crimes for wrongful financial statement certification, 
enhanced penalties for other business crimes and directed the Sentencing Commission to assure 
optimal approaches to corporate criminal liability. President George W. Bush formed the 
                                                 
58 See Ilene M. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their 
Development, Underpinnings and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205 (1993). 
59 See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability 
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997). 
60  See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 
(1994).    
61 In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
62 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125 (Del 1963). 
63 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
64 See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1 (2001);  Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended 
Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691 (2004). 
65 E.g. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 
487 (2003); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, 
Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267 (2004). 
66 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just 
Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003). 
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President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force within the Department of Justice to fortify this area of 
law enforcement.67 The government’s rationale was outlined in a series of Justice Department 
memos “getting tough” on corporate malfeasance, a 2003 version of which stressed “vigorous 
enforcement” of law against “corporate wrongdoers.”68 The focus remained on corporate 
compliance programs as the key to optimal deterrence, with a new emphasis on mandatory 
cooperation that intensified the internal policing of corporate employees.69 
 In response, prosecutors escalated high-profile suits against esteemed corporate directors 
and prominent auditing firms. A symbol of the seismic shift in enforcement occurred when 20 
directors of Enron and WorldCom paid $31 million out of their pockets, unreimbursed by 
insurance or indemnification, to settle suits against them.70 Whether desirable or not, directors 
across corporate America began to fear for their personal liability.  
A stunning result of the Enron-era enforcement intensification occurred in 2002 when the 
DOJ filed criminal charges for obstruction of justice against the venerable independent 
accounting firm of Arthur Andersen, whose Houston office had signed off on Enron’s books. 
During the government’s investigation, two senior Andersen employees destroyed drafts of 
documents relating to the work. For that, the government indicted the entire firm, then 
employing 85,000 and earning billions annually, and won a fine of $500,000. Negotiations 
between prosecutors and the firm to avoid that result, by a contractual settlement, failed when the 
two could not agree on the firm’s admission of wrongdoing.71 Though a unanimous U.S. 
Supreme Court eventually overturned the firm’s later conviction, by then the prosecutorial 
enthusiasm had destroyed the firm.72 
Proliferation of DPAs and Controversy. After Andersen, prosecutors often became 
reluctant to indict entire firms that employed large numbers of innocent people, though they 
continued to hold that threat over the heads of top corporate officials.73 Such reluctance led to 
                                                 
67 See http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/.  President Barack Obama expanded the program under a new name, 
the Interagency Financial Fraud Task Force. See http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-249.htm.  
68 The memos were signed by successive Deputy Attorneys General of the U.S., the first of which issued in 1999. 
See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Heads of Department 
Components and United States Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999); 
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Heads of Department 
Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (January 20, 
2003); Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Heads of 
Department Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(December 12, 2006), www.usddoj.gov.dag/speeches/2--6/mcnulty_memo.pdf; Memorandum from Mark Filip, 
Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), 
www.usdog.gov.dag/readingroom/dag/dag-memo-08282008.pdf.  
69 See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009). 
70 See Bernard Black, Brian R. Chefffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 
(2006).  
71 The sticking point was important because the exact admission would influence the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s decision about debarring the firm from auditing public companies—its bread and butter—a concern 
over civil consequences of the criminal procedure. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. 
U. L. Q. 917 (2003). 
72 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
73 See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons from the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107 (2006); Andrew Weissman & David Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, 82 
IND. L. J. 411 (2007); James Kelly, The Power of an Indictment and the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 47 S. TEXAS L. 
REV. 509 (2006). 
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the proliferation of deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), in which firms opt for cooperative 
settlement, avoiding the feared fate of doom. In DPAs, prosecutors agree with target corporations 
(and other organizations or even individuals) to defer or refrain from prosecution in exchange for 
the target admitting allegations, paying fines and committing to various undertakings.74 
Corporate undertakings include reforms such as detailed public disclosure of the matter, 
enhanced internal compliance programs and top-level governance changes. Terms provide that 
prosecution is deferred.  However, if the government determines that the target breached, it can 
prosecute. At such a time, given the admissions, conviction is potentially certain.75 
DPAs are age-old devices, but have become popular in the U.S. only in the past decade: 
barely a couple dozen were ever used before 2003, but nearly 300 have been signed since.76  
During the summer of 2012 alone, federal prosecutors around the country entered into a dozen of 
them with various corporate targets.77 In late 2012, the United Kingdom opted to follow this 
American development.78 Other countries are doing so as well.79 Nevertheless, while DPAs may 
be both popular among prosecutors and some corporations, they are controversial among 
scholars and policymakers, provoking negative commentary.80  
                                                 
74 Technically, prosecutors distinguish between deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution 
agreements (NPAs) but the distinction is immaterial to the questions addressed here concerning the legitimacy of 
including corporate governance terms in any such agreements. NPAs are typically used in cases where no criminal 
charges are filed while DPAs are reached to settle filed charges. Court approval is involved in the latter but not the 
former case, though little or no judicial second-guessing occurs. See infra text accompanying notes 168-176. 
75 DPAs cam resemble structural reform litigation developed through consent decrees in the civil rights area and 
resemble contemporary regulatory agency settlements. See Garrett, supra note 2, at 869-874 (noting parallels to and 
differences from structural reform litigation evaluated in the landmark work, Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge 
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976)). DPAs invert the consent decree model, however, as they 
target private rather than pubic actors and enforce criminal law not civil rights. As for administrative settlements, 
apart from the civil/criminal distinction—and related risks of collateral consequences—they more often than DPAs 
do not require admissions of facts or guilt and do not routinely entail commitments to reform compliance and 
governance. Agencies also bring the expertise of specialists in the substantive field to their task—such as 
environmental or health care—while prosecutors tend to be generalists. On the other hand, federal prosecutors, at 
least, increasingly coordinate cases with expert administrative colleagues. Coordination sometimes results in 
compliance and governance reforms appearing in the civil settlement rather than the DPA. Such reforms draw on 
agency guidelines in the relevant regulatory field—yet another difference with the more ad hoc quality that seems to 
characterize the DPA population. Even so, the analysis in this Article is intended to provide a useful general 
framework for DPAs pursued by all prosecutors, especially criminal (federal, state and local) but civil as well—
possible because of the emphasis on context throughout. See infra text accompanying note 197. 
76A data base of federal corporate DPAs is maintained at the University of Virginia, organized by Professor Brandon 
Garrett. See http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements. 
77 DPAs are also increasingly used to settle cases against individuals. Examples include the CEO of Monster 
Worldwide, who resolved a case against him using a DPA primarily because of unusual medical conditions he faced 
and Floyd Landis, an Olympic cycling star accused of doping, who created a legal defense fund that turned out to be 
based on misleading statements.  
78 See Samuel Rubenfeld, U.K. To Move Forward with Deferred Prosecution Agreements, WALL ST J. (Oct. 24, 
2012). 
79 See Global Compliance Panel: Insights of Four Former Prosecutors, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL (August 23, 2012). 
80 See Joseph Warin, Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecutions and Non-Prosecution Agreements, HARV. CORP. 
GOV. BLOG (July 26, 2012), available at https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/07/26/update-on-corporate-
deferred-prosecution-and-non-prosecution-agreements/ (“More often than not, the narrative surrounding DPAs . . . is 
negative”). 
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Critics have detected prosecutorial overreaching in certain cases.81 They say prosecutors 
impose terms on corporations rather than enter into good faith negotiations resulting in a 
voluntary or more tailored agreement. Critics have inferred this from the inclusion of peculiar 
terms, such as requiring donations to be made to causes with which a prosecutor may have a 
connection.82  Others stress that there is simply no objective basis for determining whether DPAs 
are effective or their net costs and benefits.83 A broader critique questions the competence of 
prosecutors to propose or negotiate certain terms commonly used in DPAs, which extend from 
enhanced internal corporate procedures concerning compliance to personnel changes and other 
top-level governance mandates.84 
Several rationales, however, support DPAs. Rationales include avoiding the risk of 
adverse collateral consequences of corporate convictions—the so-called Andersen effect. From 
the perspective of economic theory, the adverse collateral consequences are essentially negative 
externalities, and DPAs are designed to avoid those. On the upside, DPAs are designed to 
achieve positive externalities, which arise from their production of general deterrence. DPAs 
may be valuable alternatives to criminal convictions or civil regulation when investigations 
generate firm-specific information about corporate defects that the agreements can cure. Finally, 
both sides may find such a settlement appealing simply to avoid the cost and uncertainty of a 
trial.85 
  
D. Andersen’s Seminal Lesson  
 
A new line of criticism is emerging to challenge the lessons that have been taken from the 
Andersen case. The extensive literature routinely repeats that the lesson of Andersen is that 
prosecutors should try earnestly to avoid indicting large business organizations because of the 
risk of the collateral consequences for innocent people.86 Prosecutors embraced the point, as the 
frequency of prosecution, especially of large business organizations, declined.87 However, this 
“Andersen effect” is not necessarily a valid lesson of Andersen or the most important.  
On the contrary, empirical evidence accumulated since Andersen demonstrates that 
corporations and other businesses rarely collapse from indictments or face other serious 
collateral consequences. For example, recent research identified several dozen indictments of 
large public corporations in the past decade; only a handful of the firms failed and the indictment 
                                                 
81 Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the “New Regulators”: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 186 (2008); Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 
1035, 1044–71 (2008); Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom, supra note 3; Rachel Barkow, 
The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 1. 
82 Such criticisms can seem overstated, as discussed in Section IV.B, infra.  
83 Kathleen Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, ‘Monitoring’ Corporate Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 89 (2009); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, DOJ 
HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD 
EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 25 (2009). Legislators have taken heed, with bills in Congress proposing standards to 
govern DPAs and promote prosecutorial accountability. E.g., H.R. 1947. 
84 See Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 
1. Such objections and others are evaluated in Section III.C, infra 
85 For additional references to possible rationales for DPAs, see infra text accompanying note 214. 
86 See sources cited supra note 73. 
87 See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775 (2011).     
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was not necessarily the cause.88 Even iconic firms such as Steve Madden’s shoe company and 
Martha Stewart’s lifestyles business survived criminal convictions of those people. As a matter 
of theory, moreover, there is reason to doubt whether such collateral risks are a sufficient 
justification for DPAs as opposed to indictment and prosecution.89  
Overlooked Governance. To add a new perspective to this literature, a more important 
lesson of Andersen is how prosecutors failed to assess or understand the firm’s governance, 
thereby causing its collapse. Andersen’s salient governance features were those associated with 
its form, ownership and management. Andersen was a partnership. Its members owned the firm 
and managed it. Many thus had considerable human and financial capital tied to the firm. Threats 
to the firm’s survival from an indictment could be expected to induce partner withdrawals, 
including flights to peer firms, fueling a self-fulfilling spiral.90   
In contrast, had Andersen been a corporation, owned by diversified outside shareholders 
and managed by professional directors and hired officers, a different prediction would have been 
warranted. Such groups would have been less dependent on the firm than the partners were and 
thus better able and willing to bear the risk of staying the course. Despite the salient features of 
Andersen’s governance, however—a partnership owned and managed by its members—the 
warnings of an “Andersen effect” that stoked prosecutorial allergies to organizational 
indictments spoke of the danger indictments pose for large corporations.91 
As for clients, other aspects of Arthur Andersen’s governance, broadly defined, come 
into play. An indictment would prompt federal regulators at the SEC to threaten to debar the 
firm’s authority to audit SEC registrants. Even private clients, not needing such SEC approval, 
valued Andersen as a partnership of professional accountants and its related reputation that the 
indictment threatened. An indictment of such a firm thus seems relatively likely to precipitate 
defection, by clients and partners alike. Collateral consequences, ultimately destroying the firm, 
were grave for the firm’s vast employee base, innocent of wrongdoing, as well as clients needing 
to scramble to retain other auditors.  
Governance Matters. The exact risks of indictment and probabilities of adverse collateral 
consequences cannot be gauged definitively. Yet the question of adverse collateral 
consequences—which DOJ guidelines since Andersen direct prosecutors to study92—requires an 
examination of governance features. That is the only way to determine whether the fallout from 
indictment will hurt innocent parties who warrant protection—and not every employee or 
                                                 
88 See Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal 
Convictions in the Twenty-First Century (draft manuscript 2012 available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2132242) (identifying 51 companies, though a review of the list suggests need to 
add and subtract a few, in part to verify which were public at the time of prosecution and conviction and in part to 
address the exact posture of the case in terms of criminal procedure). The companies that reportedly failed were 
Utilicorp United, Winn Dixie, Elpida Memory, and Japan International Airlines—and two of those failed businesses 
were nevertheless later taken over and rehabilitated to some extent by other companies. Id. Among companies 
indicted without subsequent failure were several global airlines (for antitrust violations); Chiquita Brands (for 
terrorist financing violations); and Eli Lilly (for selling misbranded drugs). Id. 
89 See Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through Non-Prosecution (draft 
manuscript 2012 on file with the author and cited with permission) (explaining how the concept of asset 
insufficiency in the economic theory of regulation cannot justify DPAs containing ex post regulatory terms).  
90 See Jonathan  Macey & Hilary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, 
Governance, and the Demise of the Auditing Profession, 48 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1167 (2003).  
91 See sources cited supra note 73. 
92 See sources cited supra note 68. 
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shareholder group can claim such innocence.  The DOJ’s solicitude for such groups is unusual 
within criminal law,93 which ordinarily offers at most pity to the family and associates of 
defendants.94 The DOJ cannot intend its collateral consequences principle to protect such groups 
unless they are deemed innocent, and assessing such a question ex ante requires considering 
target governance. 
Among corporations, distinctions must be drawn between publicly-held and closely-held 
firms. These may imply different owner attitudes towards firm wrongdoing and managerial 
capacity for it, probative of the degree to which collateral consequences of indictment or 
prosecution should be seen as adverse or not. The separation of ownership from control is starker 
in the case of a large public corporation, such as Archer Daniels Midland, where shareholders as 
a group should be seen as relatively more worthy of protection than shareholders of an equally 
large non-public corporation, such as Cargill, where ownership is concentrated in the hands of a 
single family.  Such differences warrant predicting different reactions to different forms of 
prosecutorial pressure and different perceptions of what constitute adverse collateral 
consequences.  
Among publicly-held corporations, distinctions and related predictions can be drawn on 
the basis of such potentially relevant factors as the level and type of shareholder ownership and 
its bearing on questions of collective action and rational apathy. The more concentrated the 
ownership in fewer hands, and the larger the institutional ownership level, the easier collective 
action becomes. Institutional investors should not always be seen as innocent victims but, given 
activism and power, be held accountable too.95  
Again, the type of institutional owner matters along with the size of holdings. Wal-Mart, 
for instance, is owned 48% by family-controlled Walton Enterprises, an ownership position that 
may entail responsibility for criminal conduct at the firm. A shareholder’s investment purpose 
may provide prima facie clues about relative culpability or innocence, with long-term investment 
outlooks warranting greater respect potentially than short-term arbitrage positions.96 Similarly, 
some investors concentrate investment in a relatively smaller number of firms that enable close 
watch and disproportionate gains.97 Other investors, such as index funds, diversify greatly and 
should not be expected to provide similar monitoring and do not benefit as extensively from 
wrongdoing.98  
                                                 
93 See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383 (2002). 
94 See Susan Hoffman Fishman, The Impact of Incarceration on Children of Offenders, 15 J. CHILDREN CONTEMP. 
SOC’Y 89 (1993). 
95 See Imam Abnbtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008); 
Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty By Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 
HASTINGS L. J. 411 (2012); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, On the Sufficiency of Corporate Regulation as an Alternative 
to Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 118, 124 (2011). 
96 See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, The Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 
(2012). 
97 Examples: State Street Corp., which owns 12% of United Technologies; Berkshire Hathaway which owns 8% of 
Wells Fargo; and Davis Selected Advisors, which owns 5% of CVS Caremark.  (This and accompanying footnote 
examples are drawn from a data set the author is compiling with assistance from Nicholas Stark.) 
98 The best example is Vanguard, an index investor barely audible among the activist investor crowd, and owner of 
just under 5% of many of the largest American companies.  Among the Fortune 50, Vanguard owns just under 5% 
of the voting stock of Exxon Mobil, Conoco Phillips, General Electric, AT&T, Bank of America, Verizon, J.P. 
Morgan, Citigroup, Procter & Gamble, Archer Daniels Midland, Boeing and Pfizer. 
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Among all corporations, those with higher degrees of insider ownership—by directors, 
officers and employees—may respond differently and require different treatment than those with 
little or no such ownership. In corporations that have substantial employee ownership, as through 
employee stock ownership plans, the roles of employee and shareholder combine, so that any 
gains from criminal conduct that might accrue to shareholders are enjoyed by those participating 
employees.99 Shareholders owning substantial percentages of a corporation’s stock may indeed 
be victims when senior management commit crimes but their ability to elect the board who 
appoints such officers negates the claim to innocent victimhood.100  
Besides such factors as type of business organization and shareholder demographics, 
prosecutors should consider additional governance details about targets. The most obvious 
concerns the special treatment required concerning businesses owned by other organizations—
such as subsidiaries of corporate parents. Evaluating probable culpability and likely collateral 
consequences require gauging the norms of governance in such settings and evaluating the 
degree to which they are followed.101  
Every governance situation differs somewhat. Prosecutors must therefore follow through 
with kindred profiles at target firms specifically researching directors, officers, gatekeepers, 
employees and controls. That said, as a further illustration, the next Part’s case study of AIG 
begins with a thumbnail sketch of its governance. Prosecutors would have done well to consider 
it when targeting AIG and settling using a DPA. Their failure to do so proved disastrous. 
 
II. AIG, OVERSIGHT AND INATTENTION 
 
This Part, an original case study of AIG,102 first introduces AIG by canvassing some of 
its distinctive governance features illustrating the kind of profile useful for prosecutors to 
understand at the outset of investigation.103 It then explains how ignoring or disrespecting those 
                                                 
99 Employee ownership levels vary among the largest U.S. corporations. Among the greatest percentage levels are 
Met Life (8%) and Ford Motor (7%). 
100 To take some examples from among the Fortune 500 in the United States: Warren Buffett of  Berkshire 
Hathaway (38%); Michael Dell of Dell (16%); Charles Schwab of Schwab (14%); Stephen Wynn of Wynn Resorts 
(10%); and William Gates of Microsoft (5.5%). 
101 For a good discussion of the kinds of factors relevant in such a setting, by non-experts demonstrating the 
possibility of mastering such terrain, see United States v. Best-Foods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
102 Much has been written about AIG’s role in the financial crisis of 2008, though much of that concentrates on the 
terms of related financial transactions rather than the governance history leading up to their creation. See, e.g., 
Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151 (2010); William K. 
Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (2009).   
103 The AIG case study can seem aberrational, given the characters involved, peculiar features of New York law and 
politics, and the timing of events. But, in addition to remaining a bracing cautionary tale worth telling and mining 
for lessons, the potential for a replay should not be discounted. Similar controversy recurs about the exercise of 
prosecutorial authority and the independent streak of New York law enforcement authorities. One instance arose 
when New York’s Department of Financial Services, headed by Benjamin Lawsky, settled charges of terrorism-
finance law violations against Standard Chartered, the British bank, while federal authorities pursued a parallel 
investigation. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Standard Chartered Settles Iran Inquiry for $340 Million, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 14, 2012). Some stories drew explicit analogies between the two chief prosecutors involved (Eliot Spitzer in 
AIG and Benjamin Lawsky in Standard Chartered). See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Regulator Shines a Spotlight on a 
Bank, and on Himself, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2012). More generally, federal prosecutors’ offices vary from many 
state counterparts, such as those in New York, where the attorney general’s office holds both prosecutorial and 
regulatory responsibilities and pursues both civil and criminal cases arising from the same circumstances. Federal 
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governance realities resulted in a hasty and costly upheaval that included ousting the company’s 
iconic CEO, Maurice R. (“Hank”) Greenberg. It shows how that failure to investigate before 
intervening came at a high price with the subsequent discovery of only limited transgressions not 
warranting the ouster decision—let alone an indictment. Finally, it shows the perils of 
conceiving of corporate governance as a uniform set of off-the-rack devices with no articulated 
rationale as new governance at AIG led the company to the center of the 2008 financial crisis. 
The basis for two prescriptions emerges: prosecutors should strive to understand corporate 
governance when exercising discretion concerning prosecutions of business targets and should 
articulate the rationales of governance reforms they proffer when settling cases using DPAs.104 
 
A.  AIG’s Governance Profile  
 
A profile of AIG’s corporate governance highlights factors prosecutors need to 
understand when targeting a business organization. Such attributes are important to grasp as they 
reflect the inner workings and mechanisms of a company.  Along with the personnel involved, 
they are what makes the company tick. In this case, readily discernible matters included a 
nimble, innovative, employee driven culture with global reach; a diverse shareholder mix that 
included heavy insider ownership, considerable retail ownership and a mix of passive and 
activist institutional shareholders; deep and longstanding internal control systems; and a fractious 
board members debating executive succession planning. A rudimentary grasp of such examples 
of a corporate persona would greatly assist a prosecutor looking to formulate a profile to help 
make decisions about whether to charge a company or individuals and whether to proceed with 
an indictment and prosecution or settle—and on what terms.   
Scale. AIG’s foundations were domestic insurance operations assembled in the 1960s by 
Greenberg, along with a collection of international insurance businesses created during the 
previous five decades by the American international business pioneer, Cornelius Vander Starr. 
From 1969 when AIG went public to 2004, the total market value of AIG’s stock rose from $300 
million to $180 billion—an increase of approximately 19,000% compared to a 700% increase in 
the S&P 500.105 By then, AIG employed 92,000, earned more than $11 billion annually and 
commanded total assets approaching $1 trillion. It was the largest insurance company in world 
history.  
                                                                                                                                                             
prosecutors invariably cooperate and coordinate with regulatory counterparts, supra note 75, while Spitzer, at least, 
often disrespected federal agencies. See Jonathan R. Macey, State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 117 (2004). 
104 The case study arose out of my collaboration on a book with Greenberg.  MAURICE R. GREENBERG & LAWRENCE 
A. CUNNINGHAM, THE AIG STORY (2013). It is based on my original research into extant public materials, as well as 
considerable non-public materials, including documents obtained under New York State’s Freedom of Information 
Law (FOIL), and interviews with many participants. Some of those interviewed requested anonymity; some requests 
for interviews were declined. The result is an imperfect record of events, offering the benefits, along with the limits, 
of case studies as a research method. See ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS (4th ed. 
2008). Single-event case studies must be interpreted cautiously and lessons drawn narrowly to avoid incorrect causal 
explanations. See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1517 (2004); see also supra note 103 (acknowledging AIG case as potentially sui generis but how its high stakes 
and possible repetition warrant studying it). In this instance, the case study is supplemented by analysis and 
examples elsewhere in this Article and is sufficiently reliable to support the two prescriptions noted. 
105 See C. J. Prince, CEO of the Year 2003, CEO MAGAZINE (July 1, 2003). 
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 Innovative Internationalists. AIG’s culture valued product innovation. The company 
pioneered insurance covering armies, kidnapping, oil pipelines and rigs, satellites, shipping, and 
other unusual risks, helping American companies expand internationally in the process that 
evolved into globalization. In addition, despite its size, AIG fostered this innovation by creating 
mechanisms within the company that could quickly respond to a need for new products106— 
even if the need was on the other side of the world.107 Decades before globalization, AIG opened 
markets not only in Mao’s China but also behind the Iron Curtain in the Soviet Union and its 
Eastern European satellites during the Cold War; and in Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
throughout Latin America, the Middle East and Africa.108   
Employees. AIG’s management cultivated an employee-centric atmosphere, by stressing 
mutual loyalty, never leaving any employee behind, whether navigating treachery abroad or 
facing personal crises at home. A distinguished cohort among AIG employees were the “mobile 
overseas persons” or M.O.P.s. This group did service stints in numerous countries during their 
career, as many as 10 to 15, taking two-to-three year terms in each place. Akin to the U.S. 
foreign service, they were corporate ambassadors who could troubleshoot the thorniest problem 
anywhere in the world. 
 Employee compensation was long-term, with most payoffs deferred until age 65. In the 
corporate restructurings that occurred to take AIG public, one company (Starr International Co., 
abbreviated SICO) that contributed assets to AIG also received shares of its stock.109 A small 
group of Starr’s closest business associates, including Greenberg, owned all the SICO stock, 
entitling them to all the AIG shares received in exchange. They decided instead to preserve a 
portion of the AIG shares for SICO’s future corporate use. An important use, made over the next 
three decades, was providing incentive compensation to AIG managers paid in AIG shares. The 
                                                 
106  AIG led the charge to change the world’s view of service industries. International trade conventions had long 
covered trade in goods, but countries discriminated against service providers, such as AIG. Beginning in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the company led efforts by scores of other companies and successive U.S. Trade 
Representatives, from the Carter to the Clinton administrations, finally winning in 1997’s World Trade Organization 
financial services agreement. Many scholars and policy analysts contributed independent research that reached the 
same conclusions about the value of trade in services globally. E.g., GEZA FEKETEKUTY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN 
SERVICES: AN OVERVIEW AND BLUEPRINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS (1988); Jagdish N. Bhagwari, Trade in Services and 
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 1 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 549 (1987); RONALD K. SHELP, BEYOND 
INDUSTRIALIZATION: ASCENDANCY OF THE GLOBAL SERVICE ECONOMY (1981) (Shelp was an AIG government 
relations employee). 
107 For example, AIG was among the first substantial American companies to do business in China in the 20th 
century. Starr’s businesses, founded in China in 1919, were ousted along with all other foreign companies in 1949 
amid its civil war, which was followed by the nation’s isolation for several decades. After the thawing of China-U.S. 
relations in 1972, Greenberg undertook an arduous process that spanned through 1992. The result: AIG was the first 
foreign insurance company licensed by China in the modern period and among the first large foreign companies to 
resume business there. See DAVID M. LAMPTON, SAME BED DIFFERENT DREAMS: MANAGING U.S.-CHINA 
RELATIONS 1989-2000 348-352 (2001). 
108 As AIG grew into a leading American international insurance company, its interests and activities became 
increasingly intertwined with those of the United States. For example, it insured equipment used in national 
intelligence gathering exercises and military commitments.  More broadly, AIG fought for open trade in dozens of 
countries and in several important global trade negotiations alongside U.S. trade negotiators. It joined forces with 
the United States government in numerous episodes promoting democracy and capitalism, in the Soviet Union, Iran, 
Korea, Nigeria, Peru and Vietnam—to name a few.  
109 See SICO v. AIG, 648 F.Supp.2d 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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incentives were long-term: awards were made annually based on the previous two years’ 
performance but shares did not vest until age 65.110  
AIG did not enter into employment contracts with any employee, from the CEO to 
underwriter trainees, as these were not considered necessary for employee security or desirable 
from an incentives perspective. Valuing experience highly, AIG eschewed mandatory retirement 
for employees and many employees, including senior management, worked into their 70s and 
80s. 
  Shareholders. Many AIG employees were also shareholders with large portions of their 
net worth in AIG stock. SICO continued to own a large percentage of AIG’s stock, declining as 
AIG grew, through share transfers and dilution, reaching 12% as of 2005.  AIG’s other 
management-directors owned or controlled substantial shares and the company earned a 
reputation as a “core stock holding” for many portfolios, including state pension funds and those 
of the proverbial “widows and orphans.”111 AIG’s size—a market capitalization reaching $180 
billion—made it a choice target of institutional investors in the corporate governance movement, 
particularly during the push to enable shareholders to nominate directors (the proxy access 
movement).112 
 Controls. AIG developed sophisticated systems of internal control. These dated to the 
1970s when global operations demanded aggregating financial and insurance information arising 
from millions of transactions annually in more than 100 countries. AIG established an audit 
committee, led by the board members and staffed by senior accounting officials. They divided 
AIG’s operational world into 30 reporting regions, appointed controllers of each, and established 
foreign and domestic internal auditors to oversee everything. By 1984, AIG won a AAA credit 
rating, which enabled it to diversify earnings by expanding into a few other fields besides 
insurance. AIG moved into private equity, aircraft leasing, global infrastructure funds and 
financial products. The latter, called the FP division, required adding even more elaborate 
internal controls because it managed an investment portfolio not subject to maintaining liability 
reserves like that of insurance companies must. Several distinct internal groups, as well as the 
outside auditor, consistently monitored FP’s risk portfolio.  Risk management was part of AIG’s 
corporate DNA.113  
                                                 
110 The SICO-funded AIG compensation plan had some kinship to Employee Stock Ownership Plans that were being 
developed in the same period by Louis Kelso. See LOUIS KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST 
MANIFESTO (1958); LOUIS KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER: EXTENDING 
THE ESOP REVOLUTION THROUGH BINARY ECONOMICS (1986); see Andrew W. Stumpff, Fifty Years of Utopia, TAX 
LAWYER 62 (2009): 419 (noting how ESOPs gained momentum after passage of 1974’s Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, ERISA, which provided favorable tax treatment). 
111 See RODDY BOYD, FATAL RISK: A CAUTIONARY TALE OF AIG’S CORPORATE SUICIDE 45 (2011). 
112 See AFSCME v. AIG, 452 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2006). 
113 Nevertheless, even the most rigorous internal controls can be porous as AIG discovered in two instances during 
the period following Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley. In one, a junior manager at a small AIG subsidiary wrote a policy 
that apparently enabled another party, a small telecom supplier called Brightpoint, to manipulate its financial results. 
The SEC threatened suit but AIG settled the case for $10 million and allowing an SEC-designated monitor to roam 
around AIG’s other subsidiaries in search of any similar problems, which did not appear to exist.  See SEC v. AIG, 
Litigation Release No. 18,340 (Sept. 11, 2003). In the second case, the SEC and the DOJ asserted that the 
company’s FP division aided violation of accounting rules by PNC Bank when providing asset management 
services. This was settled using a deferred prosecution agreement that called for a monitor to assure that FP did not 
offer products that other parties could use to manipulate accounting records, along with payment of $126 million. 
See SEC v. AIG, Litigation Release No. 18,985 (Nov. 30, 2004); DOJ-AIGFP DPA (Nov. 30, 2004). This monitor’s 
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Directors. AIG’s founding corporate board in 1967 included the luminaries who would 
spend their careers making it the world’s largest insurance company. Traditional inside directors, 
they knew the company and the insurance business well and were world travelers who 
understood the demands of building a global financial services company. From 1984, when AIG 
listed on the NYSE,  stock exchange rules, federal securities law, state court rulings, and 
institutional investor advocacy all gradually required or induced AIG to add increasing numbers 
of outside directors.114 By the early 2000s, outside directors comprised a majority of AIG’s 
board, which created a culture in which outside directors were newly inspired to challenge 
insiders. The traditional mutually supportive and respectful relationship among board members 
frayed. 
Succession.  During the early 2000s, part of AIG’s corporate objectives included planning 
for succession. Succession is a challenging process for many corporations, particularly one in 
which the leader invested his career and identity in it, as Greenberg had in AIG.115 Nevertheless, 
AIG’s board and Greenberg wrestled with it beginning in 2000, when Greenberg was 75. They 
narrowed the potential successors down to two senior managers—both in their early 50s. As of 
late 2004, an understanding was reached among Greenberg and the board, that one of those two 
would become CEO for a trial period beginning as of the company’s annual meeting in June 
2005, while Greenberg remained chairman. Despite the arrangement, some directors worried that 
such a transition would result in Greenberg, a formidable figure, overshadowing the CEO-elect. 
A faction of outside directors even retained special counsel to advise them on succession. 
Conversations were continuing in early 2005 when prosecutors began a probe at AIG. 
 
B. Ex Ante Miscalculation 
 
The 2005 probe into AIG was started by Eliot L. Spitzer, attorney general of New York. 
Spitzer made a name for himself investigating prominent companies and people and became 
famous for controversial tactics and disrespecting corporate governance realities.116 For instance, 
in 2004, Spitzer aimed at insurance brokers for bid-rigging, filing a civil case against Marsh & 
McLennan. He threatened criminal charges against the firm as a bludgeon, to induce its board’s 
cooperation in seeking the resignation of its CEO. Spitzer declared that he would not negotiate 
with Marsh’s board while the incumbent remained chief executive, forcing his resignation.117 
Spitzer’s ultimatum overstepped prosecutorial bounds into the realm of corporate governance. 
 Intervention. In February 2005, Spitzer targeted AIG and Greenberg.118 Some of AIG’s 
outside directors were concerned about corporate liability or personal liability, while one faction 
riveted on succession.  That faction relied heavily on the lawyer they had retained four months 
                                                                                                                                                             
performance would prove dismal during these years leading to the financial crisis of 2008 in which AIG played a 
central role. See infra text accompanying notes 265-268.  
114 See Joseph B. Treaster, Some A.I.G. Shareholders to Press for More Independent Board, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 
2000); Joseph B. Treaster, A.I.G. Head Will Consider Altering Board, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2000). 
115 See Tom C.W. Lin, The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 351 (2011). 
116 See, e.g., Kulbir Walha & Edward E. Filusch, Note, Eliot Spitzer: A Crusader Against Corporate Malfeasance or 
a Politically Ambitious Spotlight Hound: A Case Study of Eliot Spitzer and Marsh & McLennan,18 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1111 (2005). 
117 See Joseph B. Treaster, Broker Accused of Rigging Bids for Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (October 15, 2004). 
118 See BROOKE A. MASTERS, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT: THE RISE OF ELIOT SPITZER 239 (2006); PETER ELKIND, 
ROUGH JUSTICE: THE RISE AND FALL OF ELIOT SPITZER 84-85 (2010).   
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earlier. These directors and their lawyer became not merely cooperative, but aligned with 
Spitzer. There is no clear record about exactly why they did so, but it shifted the governance 
machinery in favor of a more rapid and complete succession than had been agreed.  
Through early March, AIG’s auditor was prepared to sign off on the company’s 2004 
financial statements. But it soon made a turnabout, again for reasons that are not clear except that 
it faced extraordinary pressure—either from the outside director faction, lawyers or 
prosecutors—amid great sensitivity given Andersen’s recent collapse. Spitzer raised questions 
about AIG’s accounting for a transaction it had made in 2000 with a large reinsurance company 
called Gen Re, then notorious for engaging in aggressive reinsurance deals with many other 
insurance companies. Though this one with AIG proved trivial as the saga played out over the 
next seven years, Spitzer’s questions became ominous threats that drove AIG’s corporate 
governance. 
 On Sunday March 13, before an investigation had been done, AIG’s outside directors 
held a special meeting. They debated the risks to AIG of a corporate indictment, shared concerns 
about personal liability and addressed the pending succession issue. At that meeting, the auditors 
dropped a bombshell, saying they would not certify the 2004 financials unless the board got 
Greenberg to resign. Aside from not having done any investigation, the auditors clearly crossed a 
line with such a threat.  
 Spitzer had issued a subpoena requesting Greenberg to testify about Gen Re and other 
unspecified matters. AIG’s employment manuals called for employees to cooperate in any 
investigation. Such cooperation commitments are now common in corporate employment 
manuals, prompted by the credit for cooperation corporations are given under the OSGs and DOJ 
practice. One director asked whether Greenberg would answer all of Spitzer’s questions or take 
the Fifth. Greenberg explained that Spitzer refused to show him documents or limit the scope of 
questioning so that his lawyers adamantly advised taking the Fifth, though he had nothing to 
hide.119 Some directors seemed to believe that taking the Fifth would violate AIG’s employment 
manuals, although as a legal and prudential matter such a conclusion is of uncertain validity.120 
At the end of the lengthy meeting, the directors asked Greenberg to resign.  Motives were 
mixed, however, since no investigation had been made; the decision was taken in the context of 
ongoing negotiations over succession; the auditors exerted unorthodox pressure; and no one 
knew whether taking the Fifth violated company policy in these circumstances. This was a 
manifestation of prosecutorial prerogative conjoined to a new model of corporate governance in 
which power had been reposed in outside directors advised by outside counsel and supported by 
outside auditors. It showed how the prosecutorial power met a corporate governance struggle that 
the prosecutor did not seem to understand. 
Investigation.  After the prosecutorial intervention in March, an investigation was 
conducted during April, May and June by AIG’s auditors and outside counsel. They restated 
AIG’s accounting for the previous five years, though the auditor had certified them during that 
                                                 
119  A witness recounting the same events more than once rarely does so exactly and two witnesses recounting events 
to a prosecutor often contradict each other. Either such common pitfall exposes a witness under oath to charges of 
perjury or obstruction of justice. Andrew Countryman, AIG Chief to Take 5th in Spitzer Interview: A Wise Decision, 
Say Several Legal Experts, CHI. TRIB. (April 12, 2005). 
120 Cf. United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2nd Cir.  2008) (endorsing employee objection, on constitutional grounds 
concerning right to counsel and due process, to prosecutorial insistence that corporation refuse to cover legal defense 
expenses for any employee pleading the Fifth). 
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time.121 The firms reported regularly to Spitzer, going beyond ordinary cooperation to the point 
of aligning their interests with those of Spitzer.122 The changes cut shareholders’ equity, 
cumulatively across five years, by 2.7% in total and net income by 2.1% per year.123 A 
longstanding rule of thumb in corporate accounting treated variations of less than 5% as 
immaterial. Although the SEC abrogated that custom in 1999,124 auditors signed off on reports so 
long as they were within 5% of their calculations of a fair financial picture, as AIG’s were. The 
changes, moreover, congregated in areas where there had been controversy about the proper 
accounting for certain types of transactions and which auditors had debated for years.125 
The restatement did not provide “probable cause” for a criminal case, which was never 
filed against Greenberg or AIG.126 Spitzer filed a civil case against Greenberg, under New 
York’s Martin Act, initially based on seven changes reflected in the restatement. He eventually 
dropped all claims except for the Gen Re matter and one other issue in a case that continues 
unresolved today more than seven years later.127 Nor did the restatement vindicate the decision 
to seek Greenberg’s resignation—if it defined the threshold for determining to oust a CEO, few 
CEOs of large public corporations would remain in office for long.  
Nevertheless, the restatement, along with Greenberg’s resignation, caused the company’s 
stock price to drop dramatically and rating agencies to slash its AAA rating. Immediate direct 
costs to shareholders exceeded several billion dollars—an amount greater than the restatement 
and punishment to shareholders that suggested prosecutorial confusion about corporate 
governance. Worse, AIG settled with Spitzer and other government authorities under a DPA that 
                                                 
121 Accounting restatements became so common during the mid-2000s, that officials cautioned about restatements 
that were themselves suspect. E.g., John White, SEC Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, Corporation 
Finance, A Focus on Financial Reporting (San Diego, 2008), pp. 5-6 available at 
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch012308jww.htm (commenting on concern and proposals made by an SEC 
Advisory Committee); see also Marlene Plumlee & Teri Lombardi Yohn, An Analysis of the Underlying Causes 
Attributed to Restatements (June 2009) (noting mushrooming in number of restatements during this period, up from 
475 in 2003 to 1,538 in 2006).  
122 See Ian McDonald & Theo Francis, Spitzer Expects a Civil Settlement with AIG, WALL ST. J. (April 5, 2005). 
123 The raw dollar amounts were large but AIG was a massive company: equity changed $2.26 billion and income $4 
billion (for the whole period), but AIG owned $800 billion in assets and earned $11 billion annually.  
124 See SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (Aug. 12, 1999). 
125  Examples applicable to the insurance industry included accounting for finite insurance transactions and for 
liability reserves; examples applicable to all companies concerned topics such as accounting for equity-based 
compensation and for special purpose entities. After the restatement was released in May 2005, Greenberg’s lawyers 
and accountants spent the next two months examining every change made in it. Completed on July 26, 2005, their 
detailed memorandum challenged every change point-by-point. 
126 The only criminal charges arising out of the entire affair targeted one AIG employee and six Gen Re employees 
over the AIG-Gen Re transaction. The case resulted in early plea agreements by two Gen Re employees who became 
the government’s star witnesses against the others. After seven years of litigation, which included a trial, appeal and 
order for a new trial, United States v. Ferguson, 653 F.3d 61 (2nd Cir. 2011), the case resulted in individual deferred 
prosecution agreements in which the defendants did not admit guilt. The appellate court characterized the testimony 
of one of the government’s star witnesses as “not believable.” Id. at 71. 
127 People v. Greenberg, No. 401720/2005 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. May 2005). The New York Court of Appeals accepted the 
case to adjudicate the validity of the Martin Act, which Greenberg argues is preempted by federal securities laws.  
Under federal law and most state laws, proving business fraud requires “scienter,” referring to a mental state 
evincing a deliberate intention to deceive, which does not purport to be a requirement under the Martin Act. See 
Steve A. Radom, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case for Federal Preemption, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 295 
(2003).  
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would prove even more costly because of failure to relate its governance terms to AIG’s 
governance realities.  
 
C. Ex Post Standardization 
 
After Greenberg’s early resignation, while prosecutors continued to hold the threat of 
prosecution over the company’s head, outside counsel negotiated governance reforms with 
Spitzer.128 Drafts of the agreement recited actions already taken, including Greenberg’s 
resignation, and prescribed further changes.129 As part of these governance reforms, the board 
opted to separate the roles of the board chairman and CEO. Splitting the functions of CEO from 
board chairman had become fashionable, seen by many as a “best practice.” It manifested the 
same rationale of prescriptions for adding outside directors, a desire to reduce the boardroom 
power of the CEO. At AIG, this separation had little to do with its prevailing governance 
realities, and contrasted sharply with the previous succession plan which, while entailing a 
separation of those functions, was tailored to the needs of the transition. As will be elaborated 
below, three years later, amid the financial crisis of 2008, it became clear that the separation of 
functions had failed and the board repealed it. 
Off-the-Rack Governance. A pivotal clause in the Spitzer-AIG agreement required the 
board to hire a special advisor to identify additional outside director nominees and to prescribe 
“best practices” on “governance issues.”130 That advisor, Arthur Levitt, a former SEC chairman, 
directed a list of reforms, all of which were standard terms he said were best practices and all of 
which AIG was required to adopt.131 Along with the ill-fated endorsement of splitting the 
identifies of the chairman and CEO, reforms called for adding even more outside directors;132 
holding executive sessions of the board that excluded any management directors; eliminating the 
executive committee; imposing mandatory director retirement at age 73; and barring any former 
chief executive from serving on AIG’s board. None of these changes had anything particularly to 
do with AIG or its needs. In fact, Levitt chose his recommended reforms after consulting 
shareholder advocates, corporate governance experts and selected directors133—but none of 
AIG’s management, employees or largest shareholders.    
                                                 
128 FOIL 09777 011247 – 09777 011262. 
129 AIG entered into separate settlement agreements, with the DOJ, the SEC and New York authorities. The DOJ 
DPA did not address governance reforms. AIG-DOJ DPA (Feb. 7, 2006), available at 
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/pdf/aig.pdf  But both the SEC and New York agreements 
contained numerous compliance and governance provisions and negotiated drafts of the New York agreement 
recited more extensive governance provisions, most of which AIG enacted. FOIL 09777 011247 – 09777 011262. 
130 New York – AIG DPA (July 2005). DPAs often require a company to hire a consultant to obtain input and agree 
to accept the directives or else file a request to reject the directives with the governmental authority. See infra text 
accompanying note 271. The AIG DPA took such an approach. 
131  Arthur Levitt, Letter to AIG Board of Directors (March 21, 2006), reprinted in AIG 2006 Proxy Statement, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095011706001641/a41737.htm, reprinted in 
GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, THE AIG STORY, supra note 104. 
132 The addition so many outside directors at AIG ultimately yielded a board with only two management directors 
out of a total of 17, depriving AIG’s board of the expertise and company inside knowledge that had long been its 
hallmark.  For criticism of this result, with reference to the ensuing financial crisis, see P.M. Vasudev, Default 
Swaps and Director Oversight: Lessons from AIG, 35 J. CORP. L. 757 (2010). 
133 Levitt Governance Letter, supra note 131 (“we have canvassed the views of directors, shareholders, governance 
experts, and shareholder activists for recommendations”). 
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A telling mismatch between AIG’s realities and Levitt’s changes concerned abolishing 
the executive committee. Levitt supported that recommendation by saying that executive 
committees are “often a symbol of board cronyism.”134 This general impression said nothing 
about the committee’s quality or value at AIG. It had consisted of Greenberg and four outside 
directors, avoiding cronyism, and had a clear business rationale: to enable nimble operations in a 
dynamic global environment, reflected in AIG’s entrepreneurial and internationalist culture. 
 Another ill-suited reform concerned age limits for directors. AIG’s traditional employee-
centric philosophy and its reliance on experienced mobile overseas personnel led it to embrace 
employees wishing to work beyond traditional retirement ages at other companies.  People could 
retire at age 65 and many did, but a large number of AIG employees, including many in senior 
management and on the board, continued working well into their 70s or 80s. Greenberg, at the 
time of his forced resignation, was 79. While age limits for directors were trendy during this 
period, with some 40% of Fortune 1000 companies adopting them in response to urgings from 
governance gurus such as CalPERS, they were an anomaly at AIG.   
 Controls. The Spitzer-AIG DPA prescribed and the board adopted a different set of 
committees, officers and reporting lines to handle matters of control and compliance.  This approach 
put form of internal controls above substance, thereby threatening AIG’s rigorous risk management. 
For example, controls at FP had been designed to assure that no transaction ever jeopardized AIG’s 
AAA credit rating. All transactions were negotiated on the strength of that rating, which enabled 
it to assure counterparties of its ability to make good on its obligations at low cost, without 
posting collateral or pledging assets. Such controls kept the FP division from taking on too much risk 
and saddling the company with debts that would threaten AIG’s insurance businesses.  
 Employees. More tangible examples of AIG’s transformation concerned the board’s new 
practice of giving employment contracts to executives. No AIG employees had ever had 
employment contracts, from the CEO to underwriter trainees. Further, AIG adopted new bonus 
policies that moved from the long-term orientation of the employee compensation program run 
for three decades under Greenberg’s stewardship toward short-term incentives, including at 
FP.135 All these corporate governance changes would change AIG, though not in the ways that 
prosecutors or executives would have hoped. Short term incentives, combined with slackened 
controls, would prove perilous.  
 Chaos. In April 2005, FP began writing credit default swaps on increasingly risky pools 
of mortgage related debt, called “subprime.”136 During 2005, FP’s portfolio steadily declined in 
quality; it started with a small fraction of subprime mortgage pools and became entirely subprime.137  
By June 2007, AIG had written $80 billion of swaps on the riskiest mortgage pools, quintupling its 
                                                 
134 Id. 
135 Today’s intense debates over executive compensation stress the value of incentives driven by long-term 
compared to short-term compensation, which AIG understood for decades before such debates.  See Sanjai Bhaga & 
Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long Term, 23 YALE J. 
REG. 659 at n. 23 (2009). 
136 Credit default swaps are contracts in which a lender reduces its risk of exposure of loss due to borrower default 
by swapping that risk to another party, essentially an insurer, who bears that risk in exchange for a fee. Subprime 
pools of mortgage related doubt gathered loans taken by homebuyers with relatively poor credit histories. That 
increased the risk of default on any given loan; but those who sold pools of such loans sliced them into tranches with 
varying degrees of risk. FP backstopped the tranches that deal designers called “super senior,” denoting that the risk 
of default was remote.   In many cases, it appears that these firms misrepresented the quality of the pools—what 
AIG was told were “super senior” were the bottom of the barrel.  
137 MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 71-72 (2010).   
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2005 position, all un-hedged. Many swaps required AIG to post cash collateral if AIG’s credit rating 
fell or the value of covered contracts declined.  Following industry practice, AIG subsidiaries 
historically lent securities to borrowers in exchange for cash collateral which would be invested 
in short-term/low-risk investments to gain modest interest. From 2006 through 2008, AIG greatly 
increased these stakes, taking longer-term, riskier assets, including mortgage backed 
securities.138  
At the same time, a global financial crisis had been brewing due to a combination of 
forces that overheated real estate markets worldwide.139 During 2007, the U.S. housing market 
weakened, contributing to an intertwined series of economic problems that spread globally into a 
financial crisis. Mortgage-related assets began to decline in value. From mid-2007 to late 2008, 
these problems gathered momentum and amplified worldwide. AIG’s liquidity problems began 
to emerge in July 2007 when customers requested it to post cash collateral amid the weakening 
market.     
 AIG faced a growing gap between its duty to return that cash collateral to counterparties 
and the fair value of the mortgage securities its insurance subsidiaries bought with it.140 The 
combination of this gap and the escalating collateral calls facing FP squeezed AIG’s liquidity. 
But the mounting turmoil escaped the attention of AIG’s senior management and board, as the 
company’s internal controls failed.141 It was not until June 2008 that AIG’s board responded by 
asking the CEO to resign and the board chairman to assume the role of CEO as well—repudiating an 
important part of the governance reforms begun three years earlier.142 The repair efforts came too late, 
however, as the company sailed into the financial crisis to be taken over by the U.S. government in 
September 2008.  
Causation, Correlation and Best Practices. One must ask the question of causation 
versus correlation: whether the governance changes were a cause of AIG’s role in the crisis or 
merely correlated with it.143 Investigation and testimony point to the changes playing a causal 
                                                 
138 BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE 328 (2011).  
139 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial 
Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39 (2009). 
Factors included:  (1) U.S. policy overstimulated appetites for home ownership and kept interest rates low for too 
long; (2) regulation of financial institutions was poor, as commercial banks fed the appetite for home ownership 
with generous mortgages while investment banks churned demand with complex financial products and increasing 
leverage; (3) rating agencies failed to analyze many financial products adequately and the lack of trading in such 
products on organized markets made them difficult to value; and (4) regulators at the SEC failed to monitor the 
leverage of many financial institutions, whose debt levels rose to as much as 30-40 times capital and, in AIG’s case, 
regulators at the Office of Thrift Supervision, which had authority because AIG owned a savings and loan 
association, simply ignored any signs of trouble. 
140U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE TO AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 5, 17 ( 2011).  
141 By February 2008, it had become clear to AIG’s outside auditors that disaster was coming. It reported a chilling and 
pervasive problem at the new AIG: an appreciation of risk and risk management, once a defining trait of AIG, had been 
pushed out of its corporate culture. The auditor provided detailed and scathing criticism of AIG’s top three executives. 
See GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 104  (reprinting the auditor’s notes).  
142 AIG Press Release, AIG Names Robert B. Willumstad Chief Executive Officer (June 15, 2008).  
143 A stronger version of this inquiry asks whether, had Greenberg not been replaced, AIG’s role in the crisis would 
have been diminished. Many believe that the answer is yes, including leading insurance industry executives who 
knew AIG and Greenberg well enough to be in good positions to make a judgment. See Michael Loney, 30 Years in 
Insurance: Learning the Hard Way, REACTIONS: EUROMONEY INST. INV. (April 1, 2011) (quoting John Byrne, 
former chairman of the insurance companies GEICO and Fireman’s Fund). 
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role.  Forensic reports on the crisis blamed AIG’s role in it on governance, risk management and 
internal control problems during 2007 and 2008.144 Testimonial evidence, from AIG’s general 
counsel, not a Greenberg ally, said that after Greenberg left, “no one was in charge.”145 The type 
and scale of practices at FP—and at the insurance subsidiaries—were novel adventures for AIG 
inconsistent with its cautious risk management. AIG’s outside auditors discovered the gathering 
crisis in February 2008 and wrote to its chairman a scathing critique of top management and the 
governance and control environment they had created.146 The governance prescriptions clearly 
had a causal role in AIG’s near-destruction.147 
The case for a causal connection is supported, moreover, by the evidence that the reforms 
implemented at AIG reflected an unfortunate tendency among corporate governance experts to 
celebrate “best practices.” That can readily lead to believing that certain devices are so appealing 
that they are suitable for every company without regard to particular governance realities. Many 
of those devices—such as making outside directors dominant on the board, separating the 
chairman and CEO roles, abolishing the executive committee, redesigning control oversight by 
creating new offices and committees—were put into place at AIG after the Spitzer-led 
prosecution, ordained by one considered to be a leading expert on the subject, Arthur Levitt.  
But these and other changes—including offering employment contracts with short-term 
bonuses and imposing age limits for directors—were implemented at AIG without giving 
consideration to its existing corporate governance attributes, including its entrepreneurial culture, 
employee-centric philosophy, employee-ownership and long-term incentive program, absence of 
employment contracts, strict internal control regimens, and reliance on experienced and engaged 
directors.  
When evaluating how to proceed against corporate targets, prosecutors, in formal 
guidelines and practice, tend to emphasize compliance programs and cooperation. The AIG case 
study indicates that such an isolated focus can be perilous. Prosecutors must understand a 
corporation’s broader overall corporate governance profile and work within it rather than ignore 
it (or try to revolutionize it). The AIG case study suggests the value of prosecutors taking an 
integrated approach to corporate governance by considering it from the outset to the end of a 
case, including in settlement under a DPA. The next Part pursues this suggestion more 
comprehensively.   
 
III. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
 
Given the degree of controversy surrounding DPAs, it is tempting to delineate a precise 
conceptual model of their legitimacy and prescribe exactly which terms are valid and which 
should be seen as off-limits. This Part considers alternatives, ultimately offering not so much a 
precise formula as calling for particular explanations of chosen terms based on an initial 
                                                 
144 E.g., Oversight Report: The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets and the Government’s Exit Strategy (Elizabeth Warren, 
chair, June 2010). 
145 Id. (quoting Anastasia Kelly). 
146 See supra note 141; GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, THE AIG STORY, supra note 104  (reprinting the notes).  
Additional evidence, and another culprit, appears in the failure to detect any problems by an outside monitor 
installed at the company in another DPA on an earlier matter.  See infra text accompanying notes 263-267.   
147 Another hypothesis attributes the problems at AIG in 2008 not to anything that occurred after Greenberg left in 
early 2005 but to the complexity (often called “byzantine”) of the company’s structure or practices that existed in 
2005 and before. In my research, see supra note 104, I did not find evidence to support that conjecture.  
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investigation. The articulations would then form a body of knowledge providing considerable 
systemic advantages for the public and prosecutors alike. Section A explores DPAs in conceptual 
and analytical terms to define their proper scope, best seen neither as contract nor regulation but 
exercises of prosecutorial discretion. It concludes that such discretion warrants asking 
prosecutors to articulate the rationales of governance terms they proffer based on ex ante 
investigation. Section B explains the benefits of this approach compared to alternatives and 
Section C considers costs and various objections. 
 
A. Conceptualization: Contract, Regulation, Discretion 
 
The following discussion first probes the defining attributes of DPAs and then draws 
implications about their proper scope.  Alternative conceptions view DPAs as pure contract 
(implicitly the status quo view), pure regulation (a stance directly at odds with the status quo) or 
as a device derived from prosecutorial discretion (the conception that emerges from the 
following analysis as most faithful to reality). To summarize: (a) under the contractual 
conception, no terms are off limits and bargains are policed solely by contract doctrines; (b) 
under the regulatory conception, the proper terms of DPAs would be exceedingly narrow, given 
the superiority of ex ante legislation or administrative rulemaking, putting governance terms off-
limits; and (c) under the discretionary conception, the most apt, the range of proper terms is 
open-ended, and certainly includes governance terms, but warrants prudential limitation given 
broad prosecutorial power and limited judicial review.  
 
1. Pure Contract? The Implicit Status Quo Conception.  
 
Practice. The current practice concerning DPAs implicitly assumes that they are pure 
contracts to be governed primarily by contract law.  No business organization is obliged to enter 
into one. Companies differ in their response to prosecutorial overtures, due to variation among 
governance participants such as directors, chief executives, general counsel and outside counsel. 
Every case differs due to variables such as the scope of alleged wrongdoing, the relative 
difficulty of proof, the costs of defending a case and the risk of losing customers or facing other 
constituent defections. Terms are negotiated and defense counsel in particular cases, as well as 
the organized defense bar, push back on given terms. As a result, not all DPAs or all terms in 
them should be seen as impositions akin to regulation.  
Indeed, it seems that details venturing beyond fines and compliance into the deeper 
realms of corporate governance are more likely subject to greater negotiation. In any event, both 
sides to DPAs find the deals advantageous, each getting and giving something. At minimum, 
both sides avoid the costs and risks of a trial. In some cases, companies may find some 
governance changes appealing independent of the prosecutor’s presence. Or prosecutors might 
propose simply adhering to requirements to which a company is committed, such as to maintain 
as many outside directors as applicable stock exchange rules require.148 Prosecutors may value 
                                                 
148 DPA between DOJ and Friedman’s, Inc. (2005).   
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the bragging rights more highly as a way to boost a DPA’s deterrence power.149 In such cases, 
including governance terms in a DPA is an inexpensive way to achieve closure.  
Theory and Doctrine. Were DPAs purely contractual, contract theory would be relevant 
to the framework for assessing DPAs, and they would presumably pass muster given the 
foregoing observations about their features. They would be governed by the general law of 
contracts, with policing according to such doctrines as duress, illegal bargain and 
unconscionability.150 That is generally how plea agreements are handled. Courts declare that plea 
agreements are simply another form of contract,151 while appreciating special features emanating 
from constitutional protections152 and recognizing that plea agreements are formed only upon 
judicial approval in the settlement of a pending criminal action.153 
In DPAs, the validity of certain terms—such as waivers of attorney-client privilege and 
restrictions on reimbursing legal fees—is suspect. In fact, since a federal court ruled that such 
terms were out of bounds in a DPA, the DOJ has eschewed them.154 This sequence of events is 
evidence that the contractual conception—and the status quo based on it—has some purchase. 
Private parties can obtain judicial review and declarations of lack of enforceability, on the 
grounds that some terms constitute illegal bargains. Certainly, it indicates the prospect and 
pressure of judicial review and a constraint on the exertion of excessive prosecutorial bargaining 
power. 
Limits. Yet there are aspects of the DPA process that call the contractual conception into 
question. The balance of power in DPA negotiations may heavily favor prosecutors.  First, 
companies know that an indictment could mean destruction, as in the case of Arthur Anderson. 
Second, in many cases, such as with AIG, DPAs are finalized after a firm’s prior leadership has 
been removed and the deal is signed by successors happy to cast blame on predecessors.      
Furthermore, were contract law to govern DPAs, some unusual provisions would likely 
produce results that would surprise participants. For example, absent express language 
disclaiming the creation of third party rights, it is possible that shareholders, competitors, 
customers and other members of the public may have enforcement rights on corporate breach. 
That would be so if a court concluded that the government intended to give such persons the 
benefit of the corporation’s promises,155 which is plausible considering that prosecutors are 
charged with representing the interests of the public at large, including all such constituents.156 If 
                                                 
149 Government’s proper interests exclude any conclusions of lack of guilt, which would require dropping the case, 
but include factors such as sufficiency of the evidence and likelihood of success at trial. See authorities cited supra 
note 68 (series of DOJ memos concerning charges against corporations and other business organizations). 
150 See Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements through the Looking Glass 
of Contract Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1 (2007).  
151 E.g., Brooks v. United States, 708 F.2d 1280, 1281 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea 
Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1974 (1992) 
152 See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-09 (1984). 
153 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(3)-(4). 
154 United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2nd Cir.  2008). 
155 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302(1)(b). 
156 Cf. Charles A. Sullivan, Enforcement of Government Antitrust Decrees by Private Parties: Third Party 
Beneficiary Rights and Intervenor Status, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 822 (1975); Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the 
Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321 (1988). Third parties have participation rights in plea agreements 
under restitution and victims’ rights statutes, such as the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3771. See 
Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 NYU L. REV. 911 (2006). 
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this were the case, it would represent an extraordinary alteration of corporate governance 
powers.157  
As another example, the power to declare corporate breach of a DPA is often reposed in 
the government’s discretion and the government’s remedy on breach is penal—an immediate 
suspension of the deferral and proceeding with a case, likely yielding indictment and conviction. 
Such a deliberately, and inherently, penal remedy may pose tensions with the compensation 
principle of contract remedies, casting doubt on the validity of such a DPA under traditional 
contract law principles.158 Accordingly, it may be difficult both to insist that DPAs are purely 
contractual and assume that they are enforceable as written.  
Yet, as a further mark of the limits of the pure contractual conception, when corporations 
allege breach of DPAs by prosecutors, courts do not automatically invoke contract principles to 
evaluate either the claim of breach or remedy. They rather defer to prosecutorial discretion over 
such basic matters as whether the government has surrendered contractual rights to pursue an 
indictment or not.159 But the status quo is most objectionable if DPAs are conceived to be pure 
regulation, rather than pure contract. 
 
2. Pure Regulation? The Mirror-Image Critique.  
 
DPAs are more akin to regulation than contract when one appreciates the massive 
imbalance of bargaining power prosecutors can command over targets.160 Prosecutors have 
extraordinary state powers in the DPA setting, far different in magnitude and type than the 
concept of relative bargaining power contemplated in the realm of contract practice. It is not as if 
the corporation is negotiating a loan agreement or long-term lease with the chosen one among 
many lenders or landlords in the market. It faces a government agent wielding monopoly 
power.161 The DPA is a sword over the corporation’s head.162 DPAs have other regulatory 
                                                 
157 Cf. Miriam Hechler Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension between Corporate and Criminal Law, 19 J. 
L. & POL’Y 1 (2011). 
158 Probation differs. Probation contracts, formed between a convicted offender and a judge, are made after a 
defendant is sentenced and consist of the suspension of that sentence so long as stated objective conditions are met. 
Failure to meet those conditions lifts the suspension and results in incarceration. See Joan Petersilla, Probation in the 
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stipulation to given facts almost guaranteeing conviction—makes the result more consciously penal, even draconian, 
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159 Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1015 (2006); infra text 
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160 Expressed in terms of economic theory, contracts usually manifest an efficient bargain. Bargains between 
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features referenced in the preceding discussion of DPAs as pure contracts. Yet there may be circumstances in which 
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161 This is monopsony power if the government is seen as a buyer of admissions rather than the seller of deferral. See 
Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471 (1993). 
162 See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRSITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY 15 (1993). 
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qualities as well, including that violations expose the private party to public criminal law 
enforcement sanctions.163  
Ad Hoc Inferiority. Conceived as pure regulation, prosecutorial interventions are ad hoc 
solutions to systemic problems better addressed by legislation or administrative rulemaking ex 
ante rather than prosecutors ex post.164 Optimal deterrence is best achieved by inducing 
corporations to maintain effective internal policing by adopting ex ante duties—generally 
applicable to firms rather than targeted to a particular one. Hence general federal laws (such as 
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines) encourage all companies to maintain effective 
compliance programs and specific substantive regulations (such as addressing drug labeling or 
money laundering) establish industry-wide or generally applicable duties addressed to all 
companies. This value is particularly high when accompanied by articulation of rationales, 
whether through legislative history such as committee reports or administrative agency 
statements such as those publicized during the course of seeking notice and comment on 
proposed regulations.165 
Within such a regime, as a theoretical matter, there is little or nothing left for DPAs to do. 
At best, DPAs could contain terms tailored to matters over which such duty-based criminal 
liability and general regulation are somehow ineffective. This universe of problems is probably 
limited to terms that are designed to reduce the costs of managerial deviation from optimal 
policing. That is, they address problems particular firms have, such as when managers face 
private incentives to commit crimes. In the vocabulary of corporate law scholarship, these are 
collectively called the agency costs of policing. As a procedural matter, laws and regulations 
made ex ante command legitimacy by concordance with norms of publication, open government 
and access to law.166 
Narrow Scope. Under this conception of DPAs as pure regulation, it may be defensible 
for a prosecutor, on an ex post and firm-specific basis, to call for a particular company not only 
to maintain an effective compliance program against money laundering say (as all financial 
institutions must) but also to engage a special officer whose job is to assure that effectiveness. A 
DPA could likewise properly call for an independent monitor to oversee that person or anti-
money laundering processes. An additional rule could require that such personnel be authorized 
to report directly to the corporation’s board chairman or outside directors.167 
Such arrangements would be defensible attempts to reduce agency costs associated with 
internal policing—i.e., managerial incentives to avoid optimal compliance for personal gain. But, 
under the regulatory conception, prosecutors should be discouraged from proffering corporate 
governance terms that go beyond compliance. Delimiting DPA terms to those addressing agency 
costs of policing has some theoretical appeal and offers a way to curtail prosecutorial excesses. 
                                                 
163 Garrett, supra note 2; Rachel Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 CARDOZO L. 
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Yet given contractual features of DPAs, this conception of DPAs as pure regulation is not 
entirely faithful to reality. 
 
3. Prosecutorial Discretion: Most Faithful to Reality.  
 
There is a fundamental problem with conceiving of DPAs as pure contracts or pure 
regulation or even a hybrid. True, such conceptions may help evaluate the appeal of DPAs or 
assess their proper scope, but a more immediate question appears: the legality of a DPA, which is 
to say its enforceability in court. From the judicial perspective, the conceptualization of DPAs as 
contracts or regulation may be trivial compared to conceptualization of them as products of 
prosecutorial discretion.  
Limited Judicial Review. Prosecutorial practice and venerated traditions of prosecutorial 
discretion put DPAs substantially beyond the scope of meaningful judicial review. An original 
rationale for DPAs is to enable handling probable criminal wrongdoing with limited formal 
public procedures such as an indictment. True, upon declaration of breach by the government, 
the corporation may be able to obtain judicial review. But given the typical terms—government 
having power to declare breach and the remedy being proceeding immediately to prosecution on 
admitted facts—the corporation will face pressure unique to DPAs.   
Consider also the opposite case, of a corporation’s declaration of prosecutorial breach.168 
A corporation may object that the prosecution sought to indict it despite a DPA and the 
corporation’s cooperation and compliance, declaring breach and seeking to enjoin the 
indictment. But federal courts do not necessarily classify such cases as involving contracts or 
regulation, citing prosecutorial discretion.169  
As the Supreme Court has explained, prosecutorial discretion is entailed by constitutional 
separation of powers, in which the “executive branch has exclusive authority and absolute 
discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.”170 A longstanding feature of the separation of 
powers based conception of prosecutorial discretion is that the judicial branch generally lacks 
jurisdiction to enjoin a criminal prosecution.171 Narrow exceptions to this jurisdictional limit 
concern enforcing government-defendant agreements, but even such agreements are construed 
strictly in the light of the constitutional separation of powers.172   
Many object to prosecutorial discretion, of course. Critics claim overreaching due to 
biased discrimination, political aspirations, excessive zeal and, for DPAs, intrusion into the 
domain of corporate governance. Solutions include constraining prosecutorial discretion by 
greater delineation of substantive criminal law or legislative or judicial review of prosecutorial 
judgments—or, for DPAs, ruling governance off limits by statute or perhaps strengthening the 
role of grand juries in the process.173  Judicial review may nominally be required of DPAs upon 
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execution for technical reasons,174 but no judge has ever rejected a DPA175 and many do not even 
hold a hearing when asked to review them.176 A jurisdiction may require prosecutors who 
ultimately decide to drop a criminal case to file a written statement of reasons with a court for its 
approval.177     
Prosecutorial discretion has staunch defenders as well and even its toughest critics 
acknowledge the necessity of some discretion.178 Legislators and judges seem to appreciate that 
too, as they have not interfered significantly with prosecutorial discretion. For DPAs, such 
interference would be of uncertain value. It would put judges, individuals with limited 
investigative resources and institutional competence, in the difficult position of second-guessing 
prosecutors having conducted an investigation and engaged in negotiations with targets. 
Drawbacks also include adding a layer of costs. Another important indirect cost: sharing 
responsibility with the judicial branch does not stimulate prosecutors to prepare governance 
profiles ex post, an important objective of the integrated approach, the seminal lesson of 
Andersen and a vital lesson of AIG. 
Prosecutorial discretion is a bulwark against excessive disclosure of matters better kept 
confidential. Obvious examples concern protecting victims or witnesses and maintaining the 
confidentiality of internal investigation and deliberation. Less obvious is how opacity can 
usefully obscure law enforcement resource constraints that can undermine deterrence. An 
excessively transparent process would reveal resource constraints that may have adverse effects 
on the public’s confidence in law enforcement or in its deterrent value. Relative opacity may 
offer other benefits such as promoting public confidence in the fairness and efficiency of 
criminal law enforcement.179 When such concerns are not at stake, or are outweighed by other 
factors, prosecutors make exceptions, providing written explanations for decision in given 
settings, such as declining to prosecute or giving reasons in individual cases.180 
Restraint. The solution becomes prosecutorial restraint, which evidence demonstrates can 
be highly effective.181 For example, evidence drawn from recently-publicized records in several 
big-city prosecutors’ offices, such as New Orleans and Milwaukee, includes written statements 
of reasons for decisions, including decisions not to prosecute.182 The reasons given showed 
prosecutors making reliable judgments in accordance with law. They lacked the completeness of 
                                                 
174 E.g., 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(2) (allowing for deferral period to be excluded from counting time elapsed before trial 
if deferral agreement is judicially approved).  
175 GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 11, ch. 3 at 18 & 37. 
176 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, supra note 83, at 25 (2009) (9 out of 12 judges interviewed 
did not conduct hearing before approving DPAs). 
177 E.g., NEBRASKA REV. STAT. § 29-1606; cf. SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(criticizing district court judge Jed Rakoff’s assertion of power to upset settlement between regulatory agency and 
corporation). 
178 See Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 369 (2010). 
179 See Tom Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 
IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004). 
180 See Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 292-95 (1980); John Eligon, Strauss-Kahn Drama Ends with Short Final Scene, 
N.Y. TIMES (August 23, 2011) (referencing 25-page memo prosecutor Cyrus Vance released articulating reasons for 
declining to proceed with prosecution of French dignitary alleged to have committed sexual assault in the U.S.).  
The narrow exception for DPAs is warranted because this setting does not ordinarily implicate such broad-gauged 
problems and, when they might, confidential treatment can be provided accordingly.    
181 See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125 (2008). 
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judicial opinions, but the brief statement of rationales demonstrated a pattern of valid reasons at 
work, rather than abuses of discretion warranting judicial review or legislative constraint.  
In the case of DPAs, a similar exercise, with public statements of the rationales, would be 
useful.  After all, prosecutors occupy a special position as ambassadors for justice, quasi-judicial 
officers, and thus have some duty to look out for the interests of the target corporation and its 
constituencies.183 Important strands of the principle of prosecutorial neutrality direct prosecutors 
to act as objective public servants, whose clients are the public, and they do not represent 
partisan interests.184 Just as judicial supervision of unconscionable bargains invokes paternalistic 
impulses, prosecutors negotiating DPAs must protect the interests of their counterparties and 
must not act arbitrarily.185 
The integrated approach to DPAs is drawn narrowly to minimize infringement on 
prosecutorial discretion.  The articulation practice addresses only governance terms in DPAs, not 
reasons for deferral, fines imposed or admissions obtained. DPAs may be novel and 
controversial but those should not necessarily be the tests warranting a call for public 
articulation. It is the uncharted territory, and the damage that can be done to large organizations 
and related innocents, that prompts this call.186  
No broader call for articulation is warranted. There are many contexts in which scholars 
have considered asking for public statements of prosecutorial decision-making. One example 
concerns prosecutorial decisions not to file charges—declinations akin to DPAs that some 
believe can amount to prosecutorial nullification.187 A public statement of reasons would address 
that concern but also prove burdensome, costly and ultimately unwieldy.  
In short, the best way to conceptualize the DPA is not so much as a species of contract or 
regulation but as a product of prosecutorial discretion and to think about its proper scope and 
limits as such. So conceived, prudential prosecutorial restraint warrants the integrated approach 
of asking prosecutors to prepare a corporate governance profile ex ante as part of their 
investigation of corporate targets and then publicly articulating the rationales for corporate 
governance terms in DPAs when settling cases. Assuming such steps, prosecutors should feel 
free to proffer such terms, which would produce considerable net benefits, both systemic and 
parochial.  
 
B. Comparative Benefits of the Integrated Approach 
 
This Section probes the comparative benefits of the three conceptions analyzed in the 
previous one, showing the net superiority of the integrated approach—that is, the conception of 
DPAs as products of prosecutorial discretion and the call for prosecutors to prepare a governance 
profile ex ante and articulate rationales for governance terms ex post. Discussion first identifies 
advantages of the integrated approach over both the pure contract and the pure regulation 
conception; advantages it offers over the pure regulation conception alone; and advantages it 
                                                 
183 See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM.. L. 197, 
215-17 (1988). 
184 See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 866 (2004). 
185 Id. at 870. Far from returning the analysis to contract law, these observations underscore why conceiving of 
DPAs as products of prosecutorial discretion is more faithful to reality.  
186 Another reason for this narrow focus is that these are the terms most likely to be improved by an articulation 
practice, as discussed infra text accompanying notes 189-195. 
187 Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243 (2011). 
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offers over the pure contract conception alone.  (The ensuing Section considers costs and other 
potential objections.)  
 
1. Integrated Approach v. Pure Contract and Pure Regulation Conception. 
 
Improved Decision Making. A practical problem with the pure regulation conception’s 
barring prosecutors from proffering governance reforms ex post is how it discourages 
prosecutors from considering governance ex ante. The pure contract conception creates the same 
disincentive for a different reason, signaling to prosecutors that there is no need to give 
governance terms any more thought than is given to any term in any ordinary contract. A 
primary advantage of the integrated approach is that it would lead prosecutors to invest in 
understanding a target’s governance profile, which would improve the quality of their analysis ex 
ante and ex post.  
All the varied aspects of corporate governance, referenced above in Part I, would be 
potentially probative. Prosecutors would include the creation of a basic profile as part of the 
initial investigative phase of a case, to be updated throughout, and providing a basis on which to 
negotiate DPAs. Such knowledge likely would imply different signals to prosecutors about how 
to proceed, as with an indictment or to settle. In some cases, that would lead to eschewing the 
DPA in favor of proceeding with an indictment and perhaps trial and conviction. In cases where 
settlement is indicated, the ex ante profile would inform prosecutorial judgment about 
appropriate changes. 
Tailoring. A related advantage of the integrated approach is the opportunity to fix 
specific problems within a company. After all, governance terms operate differently at different 
companies, and the formal uniformity of typical regulatory conceptions obscures that.188 DPAs 
can supply custom tailored terms that ex ante legislation and administrative rulemaking cannot.  
The practice of articulation, moreover, would improve the fit of tailored terms to given 
firms. Providing written reasons for decisions tends to improve the quality of decision making, in 
most settings.189 This is one of several values underlying the widespread practice in the U.S. of 
judicial opinion writing and in regulatory statements accompanying proposed rulemaking by 
administrative agencies.190 The legal community agrees that such writing improves reasoning, 
especially concerning legal decision-making.191 Prosecutors do not routinely give reasons for 
their decisions, but current research indicates that prosecutors believe that articulation of reasons 
benefits their decision making too.192    
Evidence from psychological research largely affirms such beliefs.193 Written rationales 
sharpen the reasoning, which improves decision making. It appears to be most effective for 
decisions that involve factors that are relatively finite, causal, logical, precise and technical194—
the characteristics of corporate governance terms. Not all decisions require written reasons, of 
                                                 
188 See supra text accompanying notes 49-51. 
189 See Chad Oldfather, Writing, Cognition and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L. J. 1283 (2008).   
190 See Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 
DUKE L.J. 1811 (2012).  
191 See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995). 
192 Ronald Wright, e-mail to Lawrence A. Cunningham (Oct. 13, 2012) (referencing interviews with some 200 
prosecutors in recent two-year period on qualitative project that reflects such beliefs). 
193 Oldfather, supra note 189, at 1321-22.   
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course, and there is no imperative to explain the obvious or to reach for reasons when a decision 
is reasonably made on the basis of hunch or intuition—where research suggests writing exercises 
can actually be counterproductive.195 For DPAs, the decision to defer and the fines set may be 
respected as products of hunch and intuition whereas the choice of particular substantive 
governance terms calls for reason. The articulation practice should thus improve the tailoring of 
fit between terms and targets.  
Generality. A third factor affecting the relative appeal of conceiving of DPAs as 
contractual, regulatory or discretionary concerns how each conception deals with the variety of 
prosecutors’ offices in the United States, which vary greatly in many ways.196 For instance, 
institutional differences distinguish federal district offices from state and local offices, with 
many state attorneys general having more autonomy than federal counterparts and many local 
prosecutors being elected rather than appointed. Caseloads differ, with the Sothern District of 
New York handling more corporate matters than the Southern District of Texas, for example. 
The relative efficacy of ex ante regulation or ex post judicial or legislative review may diverge 
across settings.  
All such factors are potentially relevant to defending a conception of DPAs as either 
contracts or regulation but, more important, would be relevant to assessing the validity, as a 
matter of contract or regulation, of given DPA terms. Relative bargaining power would influence 
whether a DPA is best conceived as contract but also whether it is the reasonable product of 
volition rather than an unconscionable result of duress. The efficacy of ex ante regulation—say 
for local law regulating taxi fleets or liquor sales—would be relevant to evaluating the validity of 
a DPA term requiring a corporation to create a chief public safety officer. The relevance of such 
factors dissolves when DPAs are appreciated as species of prosecutorial discretion as each 
prosecutors’ office exercises discretion in accordance with its unique features and completes the 
requested investigation and explanation accordingly.197  
 
2. Integrated Approach v. Pure Regulation Conception.  
 
Line Drawing. Compared to the pure regulation conception, an advantage of the 
integrated approach is overcoming line drawing problems. Under the conception of DPAs as 
pure regulation, legislators or prosecutors would have to distinguish between compliance terms, 
deemed proper, and governance terms, ruled out-of-bounds.  Compliance is a sub-set of 
corporate governance but particular devices may evade ready classification. Consider a provision 
appointing a chief compliance officer who reports directly to the board, a term composed of both 
compliance and governance attributes.  More broadly, consider the example of disclosure, which 
DPAs invariably require corporations to make: disclosure is an important topic of corporate 
                                                 
195 See Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 231 (1990); 
Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007). 
196 E.g., MICHAEL L. BENSON & FRANCIS T CULLEN, COMBATING CORPORATE CRIME: LOCAL PROSECUTORS AT 
WORK 45-49 (1998); Stephanos Bibos, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 137 
(2005); supra note 2. 
197 Other differences that dissolve include the extent to which prosecutors coordinate with regulatory authorities on 
any given case. While relevant to evaluations of DPAs as contracts or regulation, this simply becomes an element of 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion when DPAs are conceived as such. Cf. supra note 75. 
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governance, but may be an equally important topic of corporate compliance. Under the 
integrated approach, no line drawing is required.198   
Scope of Purposes. Another advantage of the integrated approach compared to the pure 
regulation conception concerns the purposes of DPAs. The conception of DPAs as pure 
regulation entails not only putting governance terms off-limits but testing the validity of 
compliance terms based on their deterrence value, by hypothesizing employee calculations 
concerning whether to comply with law or not.199 But this approach would ignore the recognized 
school of thought holding that people comply with law because of norms of obedience that arise 
from features of a system that give it legitimacy.200 Many governance mechanisms fit the bill, 
not merely technical compliance devices.201 Prosecutors speak of achieving rehabilitation aims, 
changing corporate culture, from one oriented toward corruption to one embracing compliance, 
and governance devices may serve such goals.202    
Better Regulation. Under the pure-regulation conception, ex ante legislation and 
administrative rulemaking are preferred to ex post tailoring. Yet one widely recognized problem 
with general regulation that occurs following financial crises is the risk of over-reaction amid 
widespread psychological and political pressure.203 True, after scandal, populist backlash against 
those perceived to have been at the heart of problems can increase risk of exuberant prosecutorial 
enforcement.204 But such pressures appear less problematic in given DPAs with a particular 
company. One reason may be the direct bargaining that occurs between prosecutors and 
corporations in the DPA setting compared to the bustle of national politics where lobbyists battle 
each other. In any event, the prescribed articulation practice would curb excesses.  
Innovative, tailored terms that are explained when adopted could also prove to have value 
that could be fruitfully adapted to other firms or even to provide the basis for broadly-applicable 
law or rule. Experimentation accompanied by explanation would likely improve the development 
of tools that promote deterrence and compliance.  
 
3. Integrated Approach v. Status Quo.   
 
The chief advantages of the integrated approach compared to the status quo concern the 
prospect of formalizing, systematizing and cataloguing what has emerged as a spontaneous and 
                                                 
198 One approach to such line-drawing challenges would classify all hybrid devices as compliance and condone their 
inclusion in DPAs. Indeed, the class of compliance devices could simply be enlarged to admit any device that has 
more than a remote potential contribution to compliance. Defined thus broadly, many terms that might routinely be 
thought of as governance devices would be ruled in. Examples of terms that could be fairly deemed compliance 
rather than governance include the removal and replacement of officers, the expansion of a corporate board and 
populating it with new outside directors, designation of new committees addressing compliance as well as risk, legal 
affairs, or even auditing, environmental matters and so on. There is nothing inherent about many terms that warrant 
objecting to their inclusion per se. Each term should be taken on its own and evaluated for its role in the given 
corporation. Judgments made contextually are likely superior to rules stated abstractly. 
199  See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.169 (1968). 
200  See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006). 
201 See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265 
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opaque set of practices. DPA practice also appears to be haphazard, although there is evidence 
that senior lawyers at the DOJ, at least, are attempting to systematize it.205  That effort supports 
the view that the status quo could use improvement. Advantages arise from the proposed practice 
of public articulation of the rationales for governance terms included in DPAs. Aside from how 
they may improve the quality of decision making as noted earlier, such written rationales are 
valuable as precedent and as a source of legitimacy. 
Precedent. Precedent is valuable as a resource to guide resolution of future cases in 
accordance with kindred treatments of others in previous cases.206 The articulation practice 
would provide a record of the thought process prosecutors and counterparties followed when 
coming to agreement on governance terms. Such a system would contribute a base of knowledge 
on which prosecutors and corporations could draw in future cases, generating fairness gains akin 
to those of stare decisis and efficiency gains by reducing the costs of negotiation and settlement 
and increasing the quality of tailoring terms to particular settings.   
Legitimacy. Legitimacy, a complex multifaceted concept, encompasses the notion of 
justifications for legal decisions.207 Making such justifications public increases the value of legal 
justification.208 Otherwise, participants and the public may be mystified, confused, and unable to 
evaluate the decision fairly. One rationale for published articulation as a source of legitimacy is 
the reasoned elaboration provided, demonstrating that a decision is based on more than fiat, 
office or position, but principle with a claim to independent respect.209  
Derivative values include creating the capacity for outsiders to assess the reasoning and 
its fidelity to prevailing standards and related values such as stare decisis. True, few writings can 
provide a comprehensive and faithful account of all reasons, as few judicial opinions do, yet the 
exercise constrains discretion to concord with the criterion of legitimacy.210 Such ability adds the 
value of perceived legitimacy, as the public can more confidently accept the judgments of those 
who explain themselves under the valence of neutrality than those who act by fiat or demand to 
be trusted with power. 
The value in the context of DPAs with business organizations seems even more likely to 
be pronounced. An authoritative statement of why governance changes are being made would 
benefit all corporate constituents—including directors, officers, employees, gatekeepers and 
shareholders. In corporate settings where internal communications are part of the governance 
apparatus, it may seem odd to employees that such results are not explained by authorities. The 
authoritative statement of rationales would communicate institutional resolve, often necessary to 
induce employees firm-wide to take governance and compliance measures seriously. 
Critique. DPAs produced without explanation expose participants to criticism when the 
rationale for particular terms is unclear and open to competing interpretations. Many governance 
terms often seem jarring to corporate lawyers and other observers that, if explained in context, 
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might be better understood.211 No doubt, they may seem jarring to employees and others within 
the organization with whom they directly deal. With articulations, critics would challenge the 
stated rationale of a term rather than the unadorned term as it appears on the face of a contract. 
Whatever the reaction, observers would have a firmer foundation to provide criticism—or 
praise—when reviewing DPAs.  
Prosecutorial Error and Overreach. Current practice leaves no reliable record of 
reasoning, one of the important functions of offering public justifications.212 The AIG case study 
is a good example, where despite investigation, through interviews and primary sources, it is 
difficult to be certain exactly why certain steps were taken or even when or by whom.213 A 
record from participants would have been intrinsically valuable and checked the risk of 
prosecutorial error, a product of the improved decision-making that written reasons offer, and 
overreach, a product of their legitimation function.  Had Spitzer been compelled to understand 
AIG’s governance at the outset, and he and Levitt and others constrained to explain why their 
proffered terms made sense for AIG, the risk of oversight and inattention would have been 
diminished.  
Such an effect would likewise check the risk of prosecutorial overreach.  Prosecutors may 
be motivated to settle a case using a DPA for a wide variety of reasons.214 These can be arrayed 
along a continuum relating motive to the merits or relative legitimacy. At one end would be the 
clearly legitimate avoidance of risks of adverse collateral consequences of organizational 
indictment and mitigating concerns over uncertainty of trial and achieving efficient case closure. 
Toward the other end are objectives such as bragging rights, which may or may not promote 
such valid goals as deterrence and, perhaps at the very end, advancing political objectives in 
running for higher office. Whatever the motivations, however, the integrated approach 
(investigation and articulation) should channel them toward the legitimate end of the continuum. 
Prosecutorial Gains. A special appeal to the interests of prosecutors should not be 
ignored.  Gains to prosecutors from the articulation practice arise from the overall program of 
building a body of valuable knowledge.  These benefits are akin to those judges derive from the 
practice of opinion writing and regulators from drafting releases for public comment, which 
share many of the same objectives—precedent, stare decisis, efficiency, legitimacy, neutrality 
and transparency. Such exercises help to expand their authors’ power, especially among branches 
of government.215 Likewise, leadership positions and reputations can be made by publishing 
outstanding accounts of decisions.216  
Transparency. Many of the foregoing advantages are particular examples of the broader 
feature of transparency that articulation practice would provide. Transparency is valuable for 
public acceptability. The public is more likely to accept the practice of legal settlements between 
government and corporate defendants when the related terms, including underlying reasons, are 
explained. Transparency carries downsides, a cost to those who would prefer to operate behind 
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closed doors. Some prosecutors, and perhaps many defense lawyers, may prefer, at least in some 
cases, a more opaque process. There can be valid reasons for such a preference, including to 
protect the identity of witnesses or whistleblowers or to protect proprietary business matters.217 
Prosecutorial discretion should be maintained for these purposes, while preserving the other 
benefits of transparency.  
 
C. Costs and Other Potential Objections 
 
Direct Costs. Few proposals for change are without costs and there are certainly costs 
associated with the integrated approach. They should be reasonably low, however, and offset by 
the substantial gains from error reduction ex ante and improved effectiveness and other benefits 
ex post. As a frame of reference, federal regulations call for the DOJ to conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis of any proposal that would likely have an annual impact on the economy of $100 
million or more.218 It does not seem likely that this proposal would entail such high incremental 
costs.219 Nevertheless, a rough cost summary is worth sketching—and should then be compared 
to the benefits hypothesized in the previous Section.  
The prescribed corporate investigation would require that an additional team of 
prosecutors or investigators be dispatched to conduct a governance profile ex ante, and this may 
require engaging the assistance of outside experts at some cost.220 Some of the associated fixed 
costs, however, already are incurred in current practice. The investigation involves interviewing 
executives or employees and sometimes third parties and reviewing documents. The specific 
search for information on corporate practices and structures and extraction of it, as well as 
related analysis, would add incremental costs. But preparing a useful profile of even a relatively 
large company should be possible with 100 to 300 hours of effort—that incurred to develop the 
AIG profile summarized in Part II took far less. Charged at a rate of up to $500 per hour, that 
yields approximate costs of no more than $150,000. 
During the settlement process, the incremental costs of articulation are more modest. 
Under current practice, prosecutors do much of the required work concerning articulation. At the 
DPA drafting stage, prosecutors submit work for higher-level approval that would include 
memoranda explaining the basis for the agreement and recommendation. Such a practice assures 
that prosecutors operate within the agenda of their offices. It does entail additional work but, as 
the examples in the next Part of this Article will show, the envisioned articulation exercise is not 
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overwhelming.221 In an analogous context, private plaintiffs’ lawyers settling derivative 
shareholder lawsuits based on governance reforms rather than money obtain independent legal 
opinions that the reforms confer substantial benefits—an exercise in which law professors are 
often engaged at a total cost rarely exceeding $50,000.222  
When weighing costs and benefits, one objection may be that the frequency of 
governance terms proffered for DPAs is low compared to the number of investigations opened—
as many investigations close, proceed through prosecution, or are resolved using DPAs that do 
not include governance terms. If so, it might follow that costs of ex ante investigation would 
arguably be wasted, warranting prosecutors to defer developing requisite rationales until the 
DPA stage when it is known that governance terms are to be negotiated. However, the integrated 
approach to investigation and reform being proposed includes a prominent role for the 
investigation stage, independent of the governance terms in DPAs. The Andersen case makes 
clear the importance of considering governance features at the outset, without regard to whether 
the topic ever arises in a DPA. The AIG case reinforces that lesson, as prosecutors should have 
proceeded with greater caution amid the company’s ongoing governance debate over executive 
succession. 
A final point about the proposed integrated approach is that incremental costs should not 
be so great as to dissuade prosecutors from pursuing DPAs in cases where that is judged to be the 
best outcome. After all, DPAs are currently cheap for prosecutors and the proposed integrated 
approach would increase their cost. Costs must not be increased so much that DPAs are 
abandoned in favor of inferior choices such as the blunt and risky course of indictment. The 
concern should be modest, however, as the increased incremental costs, even if high at the 
outset, should decline over time as knowledge is developed, precedents built and procedures 
standardized. In any event, the effects of the switch might marginally reduce the number of 
DPAs over the short term, but their quality would increase with time as well.   
Expertise or Competence. A second objection to the integrated approach concerns 
prosecutorial expertise or competence. Many prosecutors lack training in corporate governance 
and some lack interest. Skeptics might thus wonder about the feasibility of calling for 
prosecutors to learn corporate governance, particularly of a large organization. This is a good 
objection to the status quo (featuring governance reforms without evident governance 
knowledge) but a weak point against the integrated approach. Again, walling off prosecutors 
from governance would discourage them from considering important facts ex ante. Further, 
while such a learning curve may be steep, it is climbable.  The call, after all, is not so much about 
broad vague intangible notions of corporate culture but about particular governance attributes 
that contribute to defining it and then (a) what their presence says about the probable and 
desirable results of steps a prosecutor may consider and (b) what should be changed about them 
and why as a condition of settling a case.223  
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Even so, at the DPA negotiation stage, a target board’s and management likely have 
greater expertise and knowledge compared to prosecutors concerning governance terms 
generally and how they might work at their company. Prosecutors should recognize that and 
proceed with a degree of deference, though they do not always appear to do so. The articulation 
practice would improve the dialogue and the sense of shared good faith each side brings to the 
goal of improving governance. Care is particularly important, however, when settlements are 
negotiated with corporate officials after predecessors have been removed and replaced, as in the 
case of AIG. Perverse incentives may lead such continuing personnel to amplify concerns in a 
bid to cast all blame on outgoing executives.224 
In the end, however, corporate governance is not more sophisticated or inaccessible than 
any other peculiar subject with which prosecutors must contend. It is broader than compliance, 
but even compliance requires expertise that many prosecutors will not automatically have ahead 
of a case where it becomes necessary. Prosecutorial resources will increase with time, moreover, 
as prosecutors develop accessible precedents as reservoirs of knowledge.  For those prosecutors 
unwilling or unable to learn what is required, they can enlist the aid of experts, from among 
current or former securities regulators, corporate law or business professors and the like. Caution 
must still be exercised, of course, as experts are not immune from mistakes, as the case of AIG 
attests, when a prominent former chairman of the SEC prescribed off-the-rack reforms that 
backfired due to improper evaluation of the company’s corporate governance profile.225  
Temperament. A variation on the objection about competence or expertise concerns 
institutional and personal disposition. Prosecutors may tend to be interested in—and 
institutionally directed-toward—punishment, usually via convictions and fines, and adopting an 
adversarial outlook. The integrated approach differs, as it embraces a more corporate 
transactional-bargaining and creative problem-solving approach. Even were chief prosecutors to 
require such exercises, given prosecutors may not be particularly good at them.  On the other 
hand, the DPA setting marks at least an incremental retreat from the courtroom to the boardroom 
and thus a shift in outlook from hostility to settlement. Prosecutors inclined to carry such 
adversarial traits into the bargaining process are better advised to enlist the leadership of 
prosecutorial colleagues more disposed to the transactional approach to settlement.226 It is akin to 
the shift other disputatious types must undergo when opting for other forms of alternative dispute 
resolution.227   
Potency. Even assuming prosecutors embraced the profile exercise and produced the 
articulations, there is no way to know how useful they would be. The product relies upon highly 
intangible incentives and there is no formal scrutiny. Formal scrutiny could be supplied by 
judges, as noted, but that solution, while potentially adding discipline, would also inflate costs 
and increase risks of error due to oversight by an individual who may lack expertise and 
institutional resources to provide it. 
Furthermore, though intangible, prosecutors have their reputations at stake in the 
articulation exercise. That may provide a more serious constraint than judicial review, as it 
exposes prosecutors to the judgment of their peers and other professional and public 
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audiences.228  In addition, these documents would likely be drafted not solely by prosecutors but 
with considerable input from defense counsel resulting in a more meaningful and comprehensive 
product.229     
There is some risk that such follow-the-leader practices could simply produce a 
boilerplate product but boilerplate is often a sign of optimal contracting.230 Degenerative 
repetition would produce thoughtless boilerplate with prosecutors simply going through the 
motions, copying the last DPA memo released. If that were to occur, there would be little in lost 
costs along the way, however. It is a typical risk of failure not an objection that should prevent 
embracing the proposal.  
Window Dressing. A final potential objection is that prosecutorial focus on governance 
will simply lead corporations to adopt best practices in name only, akin to how companies go 
through the motions of compliance without promoting legal obedience in fact.231 When 
corporations know that prosecutors focus on compliance when evaluating how to proceed with a 
case and settle it, a propensity toward compliance window dressing rises.232 The same concern is 
less likely valid concerning governance reforms.  
Ex ante, prosecutorial examination of governance features encompasses such intangibles 
as the tone at the top and power allocations among officers, directors, employees and 
shareholders. Such features, unlike many compliance programs, are difficult to fake. The 
creation and maintenance of an employee stock ownership plan, for example, directly affects an 
important aspect of governance yet managers are unlikely to be able to manipulate it solely for 
cosmetic purposes. Nor can managers as readily manipulate such factors as the concentration of 
institutional shareholder ownership, ownership by insiders or employee culture.  
 On the other hand, prosecutors must avoid the best practices trap that wreaked havoc in 
the AIG case. Another example of the problem, which befell the most devoted governance 
watchers, is how Enron’s board was named among the best in America233—just months before 
Enron was exposed to be a cipher. 
 
IV. SPECIFIC TERMS AND BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB 
 
This Part considers examples of specific governance terms that have appeared or may 
appear in DPAs. Examples are drawn from numerous DPAs, including several from the 
controversial Bristol-Myers Squibb DPA.234 Additional details concerning that DPA appear in 
the Appendices, excerpting selected governance terms from it followed by prosecutorial 
explanations of those terms.  The point is to illustrate the feasibility of this Article’s prescription 
and some of the immediate benefits apparent from the exercise. It also suggests the value that 
might arise from the production of libraries or catalogues of similar articulations.  Discussion in 
this Section also considers objections to specific terms’ inclusion in DPAs as well as reasoning 
                                                 
228 See Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173 (2008). 
229 The practice of articulating rationales would have effects on the bargaining process as well. See Russell Korobkin 
& Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 800 (2004). Exploration of 
such phenomena and their implications are beyond the scope of this Article. 
230 See Symposium, Boilerplate: Foundations of Market Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. (2006). 
231 See supra text accompanying note 65. 
232 Id. 
233 Robert W. Lear, Boards on Trial, CHIEF EXECUTIVE (October 31, 2000). 
234 Christie & Hanna, supra note 7. 
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to justify such inclusion.235  These justifications are illustrative of the rationales prosecutors 
should publicly provide when including these terms in DPAs. 
 
A. Officers and Directors  
 
It is common for DPAs to call for the termination of employment of particular 
individuals, often officers alleged to have been involved in wrongdoing. The AIG case study 
provided the ultimate example of such an effort, targeting a CEO. Though common, the DPAs 
and accompanying press releases usually reveal little about the rationale of these changes. Critics 
oppose allowing DPAs to require such terminations.236 After all, officers are appointed by 
directors, and that appointment is among the most important jobs a board performs. It is 
considered an inviolate mandate as seen in criticism of Spitzer for overtly engineering the ouster 
of the CEO at Marsh & McLennan237 and the more covert effort at AIG.   
Such ouster would be objectionable when a prosecutor has not made a careful good faith 
study of the claims being lodged, as a legal matter. To justify it, prosecutors also should be 
willing to explain their actions from a corporate governance perspective. Such judgments must 
be based on an investigation, not made before investigation, as was done in AIG’s case. Probable 
cause is a concept of criminal procedure relevant to an ex ante determination about whether to 
proceed, not the standard for corporate governance ouster, which is a business judgment that 
must be based on reliable information not ex ante probabilities.238    
Many DPAs also prescribe specific structural or organizational attributes for certain 
officer positions, a topic of corporate governance usually left up to boards.  Most commonly, 
DPAs require the appointment of particular officers, such as chief compliance officers or chief 
risk officers. Some direct particular reporting protocols, such as that the officer may not report to 
the CEO or other management but directly to the board or a subset of the board. Prosecutors may 
seek to separate the identity of the CEO and chairman. (All these were included in the AIG 
prosecution.) 
Any or all of these may have a defensible logic in the context of a given company’s 
overall corporate governance attributes. It ought to be permissible for prosecutors, so long as 
they have demonstrated an understanding of those attributes and articulate a rationale for the 
terms, to negotiate for them or even impose them. For example, at Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
prosecutors requested that the chairman and CEO positions be split. Although the rationale was 
not articulated as part of the agreement when executed, the prosecutors subsequently published a 
law review article in which they offered an explanation.239 It may not be as detailed as one would 
                                                 
235 Discussion speaks in terms of the corporate form but should be applicable generally to other forms of business 
organization. It is an illustrative survey rather than an exhaustive inventory, as the subject of corporate governance is 
vast. It also addresses only cognizable terms, omitting those that cannot be altered by an agreement as a practical 
matter, such as concerning shareholder demographics, as well as those that are restricted for other legal reasons, 
such as upsetting settled and reasonable employee expectations concerning indemnification or advancement of 
expenses to those facing legal claims. Cf. United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2nd Cir.  2008) (endorsing employee 
objection, on constitutional grounds, to prosecutorial insistence that corporation refuse to cover employees’ legal 
defense expenses).  
236 E.g., Arlen & Kahan, supra note 89. 
237 See supra text accompanying note 117. 
238 See Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
239 Christie & Hanna, supra note 7. 
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hope, but it reassuringly demonstrates awareness of important issues and a struggle with 
balancing trade-offs within the company:  
 
[The traditional structure of having the top leader hold both positions] has 
its own benefits and risks: a strong chair/CEO is quite likely a more efficient 
structure than splitting the jobs, yet it provides fewer checks and balances. . . .[It 
can be valuable to] have an active, experienced non-executive chairman act as an 
effective check on the CEO and to insure that the CEO’s office would not act as a 
bottleneck for information between the corporate offices and the board of 
directors. We believed that this change would enhance the openness and 
effectiveness of the governance of Bristol-Myers [Squibb]. Eventually, 
management agreed with our assessment.240  
 
This discussion might have offered additional specific reasons to believe why splitting 
the roles would be effective at Bristol-Myers Squibb, both in terms of compliance and 
performance. Such explanations should accompany the DPA, not be published afterwards. 
Despite such shortcomings, articulation of rationales is unusual, attractive and worthy of 
emulation.  
The board of directors is at the core of corporate governance entailing many attributes 
such as size, qualification, term of office, use of committees and executive sessions. Skeptics 
would oppose terms in any of these quintessential topics of corporate governance, though many 
DPAs contain such “intrusions.” For example, several have required the board to add one or 
more outside directors.241 In the case of Computer Associates, the DPA named the particular 
person who would serve—Laura Unger, a former SEC Commissioner.  In at least one case, the 
agreement provided for the reinstatement of a particular individual.242 The addition of numerous 
outside directors at AIG was also done in part by prosecutorial instigation.  
 Some might object that it is unlikely that adding any given number of directors, or filling 
the slots with one or more additional outside directors, would have any bearing on a 
corporation’s propensity toward compliance with law or add deterrence.243 But such sweeping 
generalities are hard to defend. It is possible that the management directors on a given board 
have outsized influence to emphasize risk-taking and err too often on the side of legal violations 
and that, had there been just one more outside voice objecting to such a view, a different 
atmosphere or culture could develop.  
It is even possible, in principle, that an agreement between a prosecutor and corporation 
on the designation of a particular person is defensible.244 That is especially logical in the case of 
                                                 
240 Id. at 1051-52. 
241 Bristol-Myers Squibb (2005) (add two outside directors); Friedman’s, Inc. (2005) (firm must have number of 
independent directors required by NYSE).  
242 ABB Vetco Gray (Feb 2007) (reappointment of a new executive chair to the board).  
243 Arlen & Kahhan, supra note  89. 
244 Critics fairly object to the naming of particular people or organizations in DPAs on the grounds that doing so may 
create the appearance of cronyism.  At minimum, it seems desirable for prosecutors to refrain from dictating any 
particular donation or naming any given person to assume any role. If such terms are deemed desirable in good faith 
based on an assessment of corporate governance realities, then prosecutors should repose discretion over the 
particulars to the company rather than specify a particular person or organization. To reduce doubt, prosecutors 
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a term calling for the reinstatement of a particular individual, as experience provides observable 
evidence of probable effectiveness.  Of course, one should not have to take it on faith that such 
terms are ipso facto legitimate. But prosecutors should be entitled to agree to such terms, 
provided they considered governance realities and explain the basis for including them in written 
rationales accompanying the DPAs.  
DPAs may call for the creation of particular committees, and their various attributes. 
Notably, neither federal nor state law requires any corporate board to have committees.245 The 
closest to a mandatory committee arises from Sarbanes-Oxley which sets stringent requirements 
for any audit committee that exists and then provides that if there is no separate audit committee 
then the stringent requirements apply to the whole board.246 A similar effect arises from the 
Dodd-Frank Act to produce compensation committees.247  Governance devotees and institutional 
shareholders also often seek or endorse the creation of other committees at particular companies, 
including governance and nomination committees.  
Some DPAs have followed suit.248 A good example is the DPA with Gen Re, the 
Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary at the origin of the AIG case, which required Gen Re’s audit 
committee meetings to be attended by an officer of Berkshire Hathaway.249  There may be a 
credible rationale for this: Berkshire, thanks largely to Warren Buffett, exudes corporate 
integrity.250 It had recently acquired Gen Re and found that there was a gap between Berkshire’s 
traditional tight internal control environment and looser practices at Gen Re.251 This is a 
quintessential governance issue, both in terms of the implicit knowledge of the need and the 
remedy, but with a coherent rationale. The principal defect is that the prosecutor failed to 
publicly articulate that rationale.  
 
B. Charitable Giving 
 
Corporate charitable giving is a feature of corporate governance that prosecutors 
sometimes use when forming DPAs.252 Terms usually involve a corporate commitment to 
contribute funds to designated organizations. Some critics object to such commitments because, 
on their face, they are remote from any agency costs of internal corporate policing.  Other critics 
see prosecutorial overreaching when they perceive that the charity is one that the prosecutor 
personally favors. It is obviously indefensible for a prosecutor to propose terms designed to 
                                                                                                                                                             
might forbid naming any persons or institutions with which anyone in the prosecutors’ office is associated. A 
credible middle ground might allow for the corporation to choose from a list that the prosecutors pre-approves  
245 State statutes invariably permit but do not require board committees. E.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 141(c)(2). 
246 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 301. 
247 Dodd-Frank Act, § 952. 
248 E.g., Friedman’s, Inc. (2005) (requiring firm to create audit, nomination and compensation committees); 
Computer Associates (2004) (requiring committees and an extensive array of other governance changes). 
249 Gen Re (2009). 
250 E.g., ANDREW KILPATRICK, WARREN BUFFETT: THE GOOD GUY OF WALL STREET (1995). 
251 This is evident from reading selections from Buffett’s annual letters to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders during 
the period from 2000 to 2006. See WARREN E. BUFFETT & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN 
BUFFETT: LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA (2d ed. 2007). 
252 The issue of charitable contributions has receded, as the DOJ and OSG discourage the practice. But it is worth 
questioning why. Under the analysis in this Article, there is nothing that warrants excluding the topic from 
consideration in a DPA. The DOJ and OSG discouragement may be unwarranted reaction to critical objections that 
miss the mark.  
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advance personal interests.253 Such donations may be consistent with the existing corporate 
governance or have another defensible purpose, but it is up to the prosecutor to provide the 
reasoning and quiet the critics.  
Critics often cite the Bristol-Myers Squibb deal as an example of a required donation 
amounting to an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. They single out the requirement that the 
company endow a chair in legal ethics at Seton Hall University Law School, from which the 
prosecuting attorney graduated.254 But the prosecutors report that the requirement was made in 
general terms, to promote ethical training of company executives, and the only restriction was 
geographic—that it be done in New Jersey, location of its headquarters.255 The other law schools 
in New Jersey already had a program. Management chose Seton Hall—after the DPA was 
done.256 This explanation negates the charge of parochialism and adds a compliance-oriented 
rationale of providing related training to company personnel.257 
An important factor to consider about charitable donations is the relationship between a 
company’s existing governance philosophy concerning charitable giving and the donation. Some 
companies have a tradition of corporate charitable giving, while others do not, and those 
traditions should inform judgments about such terms in DPAs. As examples, companies 
including AIG and Berkshire Hathaway historically foreswore using corporate resources for 
charitable purposes, both stressing that the boards believed that such allocations were the 
prerogative of shareholders.258 But other corporations, including Bristol-Myers Squibb, follow a 
different philosophy and routinely make such contributions. Corporate charitable giving at 
Bristol-Myers Squibb included an entire category devoted to professorships and related academic 
positions.259 While the DPA was thus consistent with past practice at Bristol-Myers Squibb and 
appropriate as a matter of corporate governance there, such a term at AIG or Berkshire Hathaway 
would have been inconsistent with their particular practices and therefore inappropriate. 
Prosecutors ought to be able to demonstrate at least some logical link between the 
corporation and its alleged wrongdoings and the related charitable cause. A doubtful example 
appeared in the case of the DPA with Operations Management International.260 It was alleged to 
have violated environmental laws. Its DPA called for it to donate to the Alumni Association of 
the Coast Guard Academy to endow a chair in environmental studies. Without an explanation, 
                                                 
253 See Green & Zacharias, supra note 184 at 856-58.  
254 E.g., Arlen & Kahhan, supra note 89; Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of 
Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1384-85 (2009); Spivack & Raman, supra note 81 at 174 (textual 
presentation of term as objectionable along with a footnote citing other sources explaining its possible legitimacy).  
255 See Christie &. Hanna, supra note 7. 
256 Id. 
257 A more prudent approach would be for the prosecutor to forbid targets from naming given institutions with which 
the prosecutors’ office is associated. See supra note 244. 
258 See GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, THE AIG STORY, supra note 104 (AIG): BUFFETT & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 
251 (Berkshire Hathaway), at 62 (§ I.E “An Owner-Based Approach to Corporate Charity”). Many AIG directors 
made charitable giving by endowing private foundations dedicated to their preferred causes. Neil Starr had begun 
that practice, endowing a foundation of modest size that, concentrated in AIG stock, would grow over three decades 
after his death to several billion dollars. Other directors, including Buck Freeman, Hank Greenberg, Jimmy Manton 
and Ernie Stempel, followed suit by establishing private foundations to make charitable gifts, which aggregated to 
billions of dollars. GREENBERG & CUNNINGHAM, THE AIG STORY, supra note 104. At Berkshire, Warren Buffett 
famously contributed virtually his entire net worth to charitable causes, including via the Gates Foundation. 
BUFFETT & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 251. 
259 See Bristol-Myers Squibb web site at http://www.bms.com/responsibility/grantsandgiving/Pages/default.aspx.  
260 Operations Management International DPA (D. Conn. 2006).  
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there is no obvious logical connection between the alleged violations and that particular 
organization or between the alleged violations and the prospect of improvement.    
A similar opacity problem afflicted the DPA with Gibson Guitar Corp. It allegedly 
violated the Lacey Act, and foreign laws, restricting the use of certain wood. Gibson allegedly 
acquired certain protected wood unlawfully for use in the fingerboards of the guitars it 
manufactured. In addition to a fine and compliance commitments, the DPA required the 
company to donate $50,000 to the National Fish and Wildlife Federation.261 Neither the DPA nor 
accompanying materials explain the rationale for that donation. There may be a defensible logic 
to this but without an explanation critics have an easy target to object to this term.262  
 
C. Monitors and Consultants 
 
Monitors have theoretical appeal as an oversight mechanism to assure compliance with 
the agreed terms of DPAs.263 Absent some such mechanism, violations could go undetected. Yet 
there is also room for abuse, as when cronyism dominates the selection process and additional 
agency costs plague the monitors.  Critics cite a series of monitor appointments, made without 
any bidding process, by the then U.S. Attorney in New Jersey, Christopher Christie, including in 
the case of Bristol-Myers Squibb.  The DOJ has addressed some of these concerns through 
express guidance on the subject but the use of monitors remains of uncertain value.264  
In AIG’s case, a monitor was installed at its financial products division (FP) in late 2004, 
a few months before Greenberg resigned.265 Initially charged with assuring that customers would 
not use FP products primarily to massage their books, the assignment gradually expanded over 
ensuing years after Greenberg left AIG to encompass broader aspects of FP’s transactions and 
internal controls. The monitor spent 2005, 2006, and 2007 submitting to the SEC and 
management periodic confidential reports on a wide range of topics in accounting, compliance 
and disclosure. AIG paid $20 million for these services.266 The monitor apparently did not 
discover or report to AIG’s board or senior management the brewing problems at FP that 
contributed to the financial crisis of 2008.267 Monitors can be ineffective, despite being costly.268 
                                                 
261 DOJ-Gibson Guitar Corp. DPA (July 27, 2012), available at 
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679 (2009); Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1737 (2007) (urging “greater specificity in the DPA about the tasks and powers of monitors”). 
264 Craig Moreford, Memorandum to Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys: Selection and Use of 
Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (March 7, 2008) 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitors memo-03072008.pdf; Gary G. Grindler, Memorandum to Heads 
of Dep’t Components: Additional Guidance on the Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-
Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (May 25, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo-guidance-
monitors.html.   
265 See supra note 113. 
266 See Peter Lattman, The U.S.’s Fly on the Wall at AIG, N.Y. TIMES (March 27, 2009); Consent Order ¶ 3.a.1  
267 See Memorandum from Mark Jickling to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
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v. AIG (D. D. C. April 16, 2012) (opinion granting motion to compel disclosure of the reports by journalist Sue 
Reisinger of Corporate Counsel), available at  http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/cc/KesslerFOI_opinion.pdf.    
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Such failures, along with aversion to accusations of cronyism, may explain why the use 
of monitors in DPAs has declined lately. For instance, in the mid-2000s, almost all DPAs 
required a monitor whereas in recent years only about one-third do.269 Other alternatives may 
avoid such pitfalls and be more effective for given companies.  An exquisite example appears in 
the DPA with Gen Re, the Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary. The requirement (noted above)270 
that a Berkshire official attend all Gen Re audit committee meetings installs a functional monitor 
employed by the parent company, providing reliable oversight in a logical governance fit. 
Many DPAs require a company to hire a consultant charged with recommending 
governance changes. Terms often require the company to accept the directives except on the 
approval of the governmental authority. Potential changes may be extremely broad and include 
any number of provisions addressing every aspect of compliance and all parts of corporate 
governance. The AIG DPA had such a clause requiring retaining a consultant and accepting all 
changes.271 That appears to be an enormous vesting of discretion in a person whose authority 
would be final and unreviewable by any third party. This is objectionable on prudential grounds. 
The call for prosecutorial investigation ex ante and articulation ex post should contribute a sense 
of competence to enable prosecutors to curtail that discretion, either by accelerating the reporting 
and recommendation phase or actively supervising any consultant that may remain necessary.  
 
D. Shareholders and Disclosure 
 
Another objection to including governance terms in DPAs is that certain terms are of vital 
importance to shareholders and over which they should have some say. In accordance with state 
corporation law, some of these terms require shareholder approval. One way to address this valid 
concern is to broaden the range of corporate governance terms that can be in DPAs to include 
shareholder votes for certain terms. This would draw on the usual rules of corporate law for use 
in the realm of criminal justice administration.272  
 State corporation law usually vests shareholders with voting power over charter 
amendments that might define certain board attributes such as size and director election rules. It 
may be desirable in some cases to consider shareholder votes on other matters typically within a 
board’s discretion, such as committee types, meetings, and attendees; or management, such as 
reporting lines. A small number of topics might even require a shareholder vote under federal 
law—such as the approval of a company’s outside auditors.  
Shareholder voting would both empower shareholders, recognizing their role in corporate 
governance that their economic interest affords, and reveal information relevant to prosecutorial 
decision making on how to proceed. Giving shareholders such a voice mutes criticism of 
unilateral prosecutorial or managerial action. It would also enhance the integrity of the process 
and increase the capacity of observers to evaluate the legitimacy of its procedures and the results.  
DPAs invariably require a corporate target to provide public disclosure of various kinds. 
These routinely include disclosure concerning the circumstances leading to the DPA and related 
                                                                                                                                                             
268 See Lisa Keen Griffin, Inside-Out Enforcement, in BARKOW & BARKOW, PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, 
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allegations. Other DPAs call for maintaining enhanced standards relating to disclosure in the 
interest of increasing the corporation’s transparency. Disclosure is an integral part of corporate 
governance and can also be a stimulant to promote compliance.  
Critics have not challenged inclusion of disclosure terms in DPAs and it would be 
difficult to sustain such a critique when the disclosure concerns management’s discussion and 
analysis of such matters as the DPA’s circumstances and ongoing business operations. As a 
matter of corporate governance, however, some restraint is advisable to assure that a DPA’s 
disclosure requirements gel with existing corporate practices concerning disclosure, such as the 
form and timing of communications to shareholders. Within the framework of securities and 
corporate laws concerning disclosure, companies adopt varying stances on how often or how 
much detail to supply to shareholders, and scholars debate the optimal level of disclosure.273   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Prosecutors targeting corporate defendants may give insufficient consideration to 
corporate governance when exercising discretion over how to proceed. Yet such factors are vital 
to both the process pursued and settlements reached at the end. They should therefore consider 
such variables as shareholder demographics, board orientation, executive reporting, employee 
incentives and other factors that bear on how any given formal corporate governance structure 
operates. Prosecutors who heed governance at the outset both earn credibility to include such 
terms in resolution, and are likelier to propose more effective, narrowly tailored terms. Failure to 
investigate first can have devastating consequences, as cases such as Arthur Andersen and AIG 
suggest. Investigation and articulation would produce clear benefits, including increased 
legitimacy of DPAs ex post, neutralizing criticism aimed at many DPAs. 
The DOJ should update its guidelines to encourage prosecutors to consider governance at 
the outset and to provide such explanations. Other prosecutorial leaders nationwide should 
follow suit. To be sure, this prescription would not necessarily guarantee better outcomes. For 
example, had prosecutors taken heed at AIG and viewed the governance realities starkly, they 
still may have decided to impose all the changes actually imposed on the grounds that they 
judged that such a radical overhaul was necessary. True, but consideration would increase the 
chance of desirable outcomes. This problem reflects the challenge of working within a 
framework of discretion. There will always be some risk of error. While not guaranteed, this 
integrated approach is better than the status quo. After all, had prosecutors studied Andersen in 
the prescribed way, a better outcome is highly likely. 
In short: the proposal recognizes the proliferation of DPAs as a novel form of corporate 
criminal justice administration that would benefit from being formalized, systematized and 
catalogued, rather than maintained in the black box of traditional prosecutorial discretion. 
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A. Bristol-Myers Squibb Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
 
The following are excerpts from the DPA dated June 15, 2005 between Bristol-Myers 
Squibb (“BMS”) and the U.S. Department of Justice, District of New Jersey (referred to as the 
“Office”) arising out of alleged accounting violations concerning the timing, measurement and 
disclosure of transactions that had the effect of premature recognition of revenue. Appendix B 
excerpts prosecutorial explanations, addressing most of the following directly. 
 
5. BMS has undertaken extensive reforms and remedial actions in response to the conduct at BMS 
that is and has been the subject of the investigation by the Office. These reforms and remedial actions 
have included:  
  (a) Retaining the Honorable Frederick B. Lacey as Independent Advisor, to conduct a 
comprehensive review of the implementation and effectiveness of the internal controls, financial reporting, 
disclosure, planning, budget and projection processes and related compliance functions of the Company, 
as well as to serve additional supervisory and monitoring functions described herein; . . .  
  (d) Making significant personnel changes . . . after the Office commenced its investigation 
including: (i) replacing the former Chief Financial Officer (CFO); (ii) replacing the former President of the 
Worldwide Medicines Group; (iii) replacing the former Controller; (iv) establishing the position of Assistant 
Controller for Financial Compliance and Control; (v) establishing the position of Chief Compliance Officer; 
(vi) establishing a position for an experienced securities regulation and disclosure lawyer who has a 
significant role in all BMS disclosure responsibilities;  
  (e) Changing its budget process, to assure that appropriate consideration is given to input and 
analysis from the bottom to top, and not exclusively from top to bottom, and adequately documenting that 
process;  
  (f) Forming a business risk and disclosure group that includes senior management, the 
Independent Advisor and counsel to the Independent Advisor;  
  (g) Identifying and implementing actions to improve the effectiveness of its disclosure controls and 
procedures and internal controls, including enhancing its resources and training with respect to financial 
reporting and disclosure responsibilities, and reviewing such actions with its Audit Committee and 
independent auditors;  
(h) Implementing a formal review and certification process of its annual and quarterly reports filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and  
  (i) Providing an effective mechanism in the form of a confidential hotline and e-mail address, of 
which BMS employees are informed and can use to notify BMS of any concerns about wholesaler inventory 
levels or the integrity of the financial disclosures, books and records of BMS. . . .  
  8. BMS shall establish the position of non-executive Chairman of the BMS Board of Directors (the 
“Non-Executive Chairman”), to advance and underscore the Company’s commitment to exemplary 
corporate citizenship, to best practices of effective corporate governance and the highest principles of 
integrity and professionalism, and to fostering a culture of openness, accountability and compliance 
throughout the Company. BMS shall retain the position of Non-Executive Chairman at least throughout the 
term of this Agreement.  
  9. BMS agrees to appoint an additional non-executive Director acceptable to the Office to the BMS 
Board of Directors within sixty (60) days of the execution of this Agreement.  
  10. The Company’s CFO, General Counsel, and Chief Compliance Officer regularly shall brief and 
provide information to the Non-Executive Chairman, in a manner to be determined by the Non-Executive 
Chairman. In addition, the Non-Executive Chairman shall have the authority to meet with, and require 
reports on any subject from, any officer or employee of the Company.   
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11. BMS agrees that until at least the date of the filing of the Company’s Form 10-K for the year 
ended 2006, it will retain an outside, independent individual or entity (the “Monitor”), selected by BMS and 
approved by the Office. BMS may employ as the Monitor the Honorable Frederick B. Lacey. It shall be a 
condition of the Monitor’s retention that the Monitor is independent of BMS and that no attorney-client 
relationship shall be formed between the Monitor and BMS.   
12. The Monitor shall:  (a) Monitor BMS’s compliance with this Agreement, and have authority to 
require BMS to take any steps he believes are necessary to comply with the terms of this Agreement; (b) 
Continue the review, reforms and other functions undertaken as the Independent Advisor;  (c) Report to the 
Office, on at least a quarterly basis and between thirty and forty-five calendar days after the filing of the 
Company’s Form 10-K for the year ended 2006, as to BMS’s compliance with this Agreement and the 
implementation and effectiveness of the internal controls, financial reporting, disclosure processes and 
related compliance functions of the Company. . . . (d) Cooperate with the SEC and provide information 
about BMS as requested by that agency; (e) Monitor BMS’s compliance with applicable federal securities 
laws, and in his quarterly reports make recommendations necessary to ensure that the Company complies 
with applicable federal securities laws; . . .   
13. BMS agrees that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Non-Executive Chairman, and General 
Counsel will meet quarterly with the Office and the Monitor, in conjunction with the Monitor’s quarterly 
reports.   
14. BMS shall adopt all recommendations contained in each report submitted by the Monitor to the 
Office unless BMS objects to the recommendation and the Office agrees that adoption of the 
recommendation should not be required. The Monitor’s reports to the Office shall not be received or 
reviewed by BMS prior to submission to the Office; such reports will be preliminary until senior 
management of BMS is given the opportunity, within ten (10) days after the submission of the report to the 
Office, to comment to the Monitor and the Office in writing upon such reports, and the Monitor has reviewed 
and provided to the Office responses to such comments, upon which such reports shall be considered final. 
. . .  
17. The Non-Executive Chairman and the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors shall 
set goals and objectives relevant to compensation of the CEO, evaluate the CEO’s performance in light of 
those goals and objectives, and recommend to the Board of Directors compensation based on this 
evaluation.   
18. BMS agrees that it will establish and maintain a training and education program, which shall be 
reviewed and approved by the Board of Directors, designed to advance and underscore the Company’s 
commitment to exemplary corporate citizenship, to best practices of effective corporate governance and the 
highest principles of integrity and professionalism, and to fostering a culture of openness, accountability 
and compliance throughout the Company. . . .  The Board of Directors shall communicate to the Mandatory 
Participants, in writing or by video, its review and endorsement of the training and education program. . . .  
20. BMS shall endow a chair at Seton Hall University School of Law dedicated to the teaching of 
business ethics and corporate governance, which position shall include conducting one or more seminars 
per year on business ethics and corporate governance at Seton Hall University School of Law that 
members of BMS’s executive and management staff, along with representatives of the executive and 
management staffs of other companies in the New Jersey area, may attend. . . .  
22. Within thirty (30) days of the execution of this Agreement, BMS agrees to call a meeting, on a 
date mutually agreed upon by BMS and the Office, of its senior executives and any senior financial 
personnel, and any other BMS employees who the Company desires to attend, such meeting to be 
attended by the United States Attorney and other representatives of the Office for the purpose of 
communicating the goals and expected effect of this Agreement. 
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23. For a period of one year from the execution of this Agreement, the Non-Executive Chairman, 
CEO, and General Counsel shall contemporaneously monitor either in person or telephonically BMS’s 
quarterly conference calls for analysts (“analyst calls”), and the Non-Executive Chairman shall attend and 
participate in any preparatory meetings held among the CEO, the CFO, the General Counsel and other 
members of BMS senior management in anticipation of the analyst calls. The General Counsel shall ensure 
that representatives of the BMS legal division are informed and consulted regarding, at a minimum, issues 
relating to disclosure or securities law that may arise in the course of preparing for the analyst calls.   
24. The CEO and CFO shall prepare and submit to the Non-Executive Chairman, Chief 
Compliance Officer and the Monitor described in paragraph 11 written reports on the following subjects: (a) 
all non-standard transactions with major U.S. wholesalers, such written report to be submitted within fifteen 
(15) days of such transaction; (b) an overview and analysis of BMS’s annual budget process for its major 
business units, including description of significant instances of any top-down changes to business unit 
submissions, such written report to be submitted together with the proposed budget submitted for approval 
to the Board of Directors; (c) sales and earnings forecasts or projections at the corporate or major business 
unit level which indicate a quarterly target will not be met, together with a description of steps subsequently 
taken, if any, to achieve the budget target, such written report to be submitted quarterly and at least ten 
(10) business days prior to the Company’s scheduled quarterly analyst call; d) description of significant 
instances in which the preliminary quarterly closing of the books of any major business unit indicated that 
the business unit would not meet its budget target for any sales or earnings measure.   
25. BMS agrees that it shall include in its quarterly and annual public filings with the SEC and its 
annual report to shareholders financial disclosures concerning the following: (a)(i) for the Company’s U.S. 
Pharmaceuticals business, estimated wholesaler/direct-customer inventory levels of the top fifteen (15) 
products sold by such business and (ii) for major non-U.S. countries, estimated aggregate 
wholesaler/direct-customer inventory levels of the top fifteen (15) pharmaceutical products sold in such 
countries taken as a whole measured by aggregate annual sales in such countries; (b) arrangements with 
and policies concerning wholesalers/direct customers and other distributors of such products, including but 
not limited to efforts by BMS to control and monitor wholesaler/distributor inventory levels; (c) data 
concerning prescriptions or other measures of end-user demand for such top fifteen (15) BMS 
pharmaceutical products sold within the U.S. and in major non-U.S. countries; (d) acquisition, divestiture, 
and restructuring reserve policies and activity; and (e) rebate accrual policies and activity. The CEO shall, 
at the annual BMS shareholder meeting, report to the shareholders on these topics.   
26. BMS agrees that it will continue to review and improve, where necessary, the content of its 
public financial and non-financial public disclosures, including periodic SEC filings, annual and other 
shareholder reports, press releases, and disclosures during analyst conference calls, as well as during 
meetings with investors and credit ratings agencies. BMS agrees that it will at all times strive for openness 
and transparency in its public reporting and disclosures.   
27. BMS shall encourage the free flow of information between its employees and its external 
auditor, and encourage its CFO and senior finance personnel to seek advice from the external auditor. The 
CEO, CFO, General Counsel, and Chief Compliance Officer shall meet quarterly with the Company’s 
external auditors, such meeting to occur following the closing of the Company’s books for the quarter and 
prior to the Company’s scheduled quarterly analyst call.  At the quarterly meeting, the BMS attendees shall 
discuss business and financial reporting developments, issues and trends with the external auditor, as well 
as provide information to the external auditor concerning the subjects described in paragraph 24 above, 
and shall respond to inquiries from the external auditor.  
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B. Prosecutors’ Articulations on Bristol-Myers Squibb DPA 
 
The following are excerpts from the law review article, published in 2006, by prosecutors 
in the case of Bristol-Myers Squibb (“BMS”) explaining some of the governance terms of the 
DPA excerpted in Appendix A.274 Far from perfect and perhaps not even optimal, it illustrates 
the relative ease of the exercise and suggests the potential value of articulations that, together, 
furnish considerable systemic benefits. The article also explained some of the background of the 
investigation, including highlights of the company’s governance profile reflecting a degree of ex 
ante consideration of important factors. 
 
One issue we faced was how to reverse Bristol-Myers’ failures to disclose facts underlying its 
channel stuffing, accruals for rebates, and manipulation of reserves. The deferred prosecution agreement 
deals with the most obvious aspect of this problem by mandating specific disclosures in Bristol-Myers’ 
public filings with the SEC and its annual report to shareholders [quoting ¶25 as follows]: 
Bristol-Myers agrees that it shall include in its quarterly and annual public filings with the 
SEC and its annual report to shareholders financial disclosures concerning the following: 
(a)(i) for the Company’s U.S. Pharmaceuticals business, estimated wholesaler/direct-
customer inventory levels of the top fifteen (15) products sold by such business and (ii) 
for major non-U.S. countries, estimated aggregate wholesaler/direct-customer inventory 
levels of the top fifteen (15) pharmaceutical products sold in such countries taken as a 
whole measured by aggregate annual sales in such countries; (b) arrangements with and 
policies concerning wholesalers/direct customers and other distributors of such products, 
including but not limited to efforts by Bristol-Myers to control and monitor 
wholesaler/distributor inventory levels; (c) data concerning prescriptions or other 
measures of end-user demand for such top fifteen (15) Bristol-Myers pharmaceutical 
products sold within the U.S. and in major non-U.S. countries; (d) acquisition, divestiture, 
and restructuring reserve policies and activity; and (e) rebate accrual policies and 
activity. The CEO shall, at the annual Bristol-Myers shareholder meeting, report to the 
shareholders on these topics. 
Requiring specific disclosures, however, is somewhat akin to treating the symptoms of a disease 
and not its causes. Therefore, we sought a more fundamental change in Bristol-Myers’ attitude toward the 
investing public. To that end, the deferred prosecution agreement [in ¶26] includes Bristol-Myers’ 
commitment “that it will at all times strive for openness and transparency in its public reporting and 
disclosures” and “that it will continue to review and improve, where necessary, the content of its public 
financial and non-financial public disclosures, including periodic SEC filings, annual and other shareholder 
reports, press releases, and disclosures during analyst conference calls, as well as during meetings with 
investors and credit ratings agencies.”  
The deferred prosecution agreement also calls for Bristol-Myers to utilize the expertise of its 
outside auditors on disclosure and accounting matters [quoting ¶27 as follows]: 
Bristol-Myers shall encourage the free flow of information between its employees and its 
external auditor, and encourage its CFO and senior finance personnel to seek advice 
from the external auditor. The CEO, CFO, General Counsel, and Chief Compliance 
Officer shall meet quarterly with the Company’s external auditors . . . prior to the 
                                                 
274 These selections are from Christie & Hanna, supra note 7, at 1053-58. 
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Company’s scheduled quarterly analyst call. At the quarterly meeting, the Bristol-Myers 
attendees shall discuss business and financial reporting developments, issues and 
trends with the external auditor, as well as provide information to the external auditor 
concerning the subjects described in paragraph 24, and shall respond to inquiries from 
the external auditor.  
By including provisions relating to transparency, our intent was to address both specific failings 
uncovered in the investigation and an equally disturbing corporate culture that favored secrecy over 
openness. For example, by requiring regular quarterly meetings among senior management and their 
independent auditors, our expectation is that if future law breaking were to occur, it would be much more 
difficult for top management and the auditors to claim ignorance. The goal is that Bristol-Myers should 
report all material facts, good and bad, to the investing public. With respect to unfavorable news, Bristol-
Myers must get into the habit of disclosure, not concealment; if there is a question about whether or not to 
disclose something, the deferred prosecution agreement clearly calls for more information, not less. 
Perhaps the most difficult issue to address in this matter was reforming Bristol-Myers’ corporate 
governance in ways that would give some assurance that the failures [we found] would not be repeated. At 
the very least, Bristol-Myers’ remaining top management failed to detect and prevent the wrongdoing [we 
found]. Yet federal prosecutors must tread warily in the area of corporate governance. Plainly, federal 
prosecutors have no business telling corporate executives what business judgments to make or otherwise 
intruding into business decisions. It was clear to us, however, that Bristol-Myers’ board of directors and top 
executives had to be more involved in governing the company and therefore more accountable to all its 
stakeholders. This greater involvement of top management, together with a healthy dose of outside 
oversight, would provide confidence that Bristol-Myers will not repeat past sins. 
Bristol-Myers, like many U.S. companies, had historically allowed its top leader to hold both 
positions of chairman of the board of directors and chief executive officer (CEO). This structure 
undoubtedly has its own benefits and risks: a strong chair/CEO is quite likely a more efficient structure than 
splitting those jobs, yet it provides fewer checks and balances. We determined there were three options to 
deal with the failure of the CEO and the board of directors to address the wrongdoing that occurred on their 
watch. The first was to leave the governance structure intact and hope the other provisions of the deferred 
prosecution agreement (along with the presence of the federal monitor) would solve the problem. The 
second alternative was to demand the resignation of the chairman and CEO for failure to discover and 
address the wrongdoing. The third was a hybrid of the first two options, which was formulated during 
negotiations with corporate counsel. The reasoning behind this provision was two-fold: to have an active, 
experienced non-executive chairman act as an effective check on the CEO; and to insure that the CEO’s 
office would not act as a bottleneck for information between the corporate officers and the board of 
directors. We believed this change would enhance the openness and effectiveness of the governance of 
Bristol-Myers. Eventually, management agreed with our assessment. 
The Bristol-Myers deferred prosecution agreement requires the company to split the roles of board 
chair and chief executive [quoting ¶8]: 
Bristol-Myers shall establish the position of non-executive Chairman of the Bristol-Myers 
Board of Directors (the “Non-Executive Chairman”), to advance and underscore the 
Company’s commitment to exemplary corporate citizenship, to best practices of effective 
corporate governance and the highest principles of integrity and professionalism, and to 
fostering a culture of openness, accountability and compliance throughout the Company. 
Bristol-Myers shall retain the position of Non-Executive Chairman at least throughout the 
term of this Agreement.  
This approach, we feel, provides maximum board involvement in and accountability for Bristol-
Myers’ business decisions, including its public disclosures. The deferred prosecution agreement 
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deliberately avoids any temptation to micro-manage the role of the non-executive chairman. Instead, it sets 
forth aspirational goals for the company and mandates information sharing with the non-executive 
chairman. [The article here quotes ¶10.] It also gives the non-executive chairman a limited role in preparing 
for and monitoring quarterly conference calls with Wall Street analysts and investors. [The article here 
quotes ¶23.]  The Board selected James D. Robinson III, a long-time Bristol-Myers Director, to fill this role. 
In addition to splitting the roles of board chair and chief executive, the deferred prosecution 
agreement also requires Bristol-Myers to appoint an additional non-executive Director acceptable to the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office. Our aim was to bring fresh blood and a new perspective to the board of directors; 
our preference for someone with a law enforcement background was made clear. Accordingly, Bristol-
Myers selected, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office approved, Louis J. Freeh, a former federal judge, federal 
prosecutor, and Director of the FBI, as the additional director. 
Our conclusions regarding these governance issues were informed by meetings with both the CEO 
and the entire board of directors. The U.S. Attorney, along with the other prosecutors on the investigation, 
met a number of times with the CEO. One of the purposes of these meetings was to gain insight into the 
way management actually worked at Bristol-Myers. That knowledge helped us to intelligently and 
comprehensively negotiate a deferred prosecution agreement that dealt with the real problems at Bristol-
Myers. The CEO gave us a real insider’s view of how these events unfolded from his perspective. 
We questioned the CEO regarding his relationship with his other senior officers, the board of 
directors, and his external auditors. We were attempting to find out every detail we could as to why the 
governance structures at Bristol-Myers had failed. By the very nature of the questions, these conversations 
were at times contentious. We discovered, however, that one of the root causes of the failures was the lack 
of timely and relevant information reaching all the decision makers at the top of the corporate chain of 
command. This led us to the conclusion that alternative information pipelines had to be opened in addition 
to the pipeline into the CEO’s office. This further reinforced our conviction that the splitting of the chairman 
and CEO positions was a good idea. 
Once we decided that the separation of the chairman and CEO’s position was advisable, we felt 
that a meeting with the entire board of directors was necessary. We traveled to a regularly scheduled board 
meeting in Wilmington, Delaware and engaged in a ninety-minute open exchange with the Board. It was an 
opportunity to discuss previous conduct, and our ideas for future remediation, with the board. The Board 
shared with us their concerns about a deferred prosecution agreement and the potential effect on their 
business plans. Most importantly, we were able to gauge the commitment of the Board to real change in 
governance. The meeting also gave us the chance to assess each board member in light of our desire to 
potentially find a non-executive chairman who had a deep knowledge of Bristol-Myers and a real desire to 
be an agent of change of the corporate culture, which created these issues in the first place. 
These corporate governance changes, along with the other governance measures Bristol-Myers 
adopted prior to the deferred prosecution agreement are no guarantee of perfectly smooth sailing during 
the term of the agreement. Regardless, this increased internal accountability should go a long way toward 
achieving the goal of good corporate citizenship. We believed, however, that more was needed from 
outsiders to insure compliance with the agreement and a change in corporate culture. 
The maxim “trust but verify” applies in deferred prosecution agreements. From the prosecutor’s 
point of view, it would be highly irresponsible to allow a corporation whose prosecution is being deferred to 
go unsupervised during the deferral period. Bristol-Myers, to its credit, recognized at the inception of the 
investigation, and long before we began to negotiate the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement, that 
outside help would benefit the company. The company retained as an independent advisor the Honorable 
Frederick B. Lacey, a former U.S. Attorney and federal judge in the District of New Jersey, and gave him a 
broad mandate to review the company’s internal controls, financial reporting, disclosure, compliance, and 
budget processes. We requested, and Bristol-Myers agreed, to expand Judge Lacey’s role to become the 
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independent federal monitor at Bristol-Myers. 
The independent monitor has wide authority to oversee Bristol-Myer’s compliance with the deferred 
prosecution agreement and strengthen its ongoing remediation efforts. [The DPA at ¶12] charges the 
monitor to perform the following tasks, among others:  
(a) Monitor Bristol-Myers’ compliance with this Agreement, and have authority to require 
Bristol-Myers to take any steps he believes are necessary to comply with the terms of this 
Agreement; (b) Continue the review, reforms and other functions undertaken as the 
Independent Advisor; (c) Report to the Office, on at least a quarterly basis . . .  as to 
Bristol-Myers’ compliance with this Agreement and the implementation and effectiveness 
of the internal controls, financial reporting, disclosure processes and related compliance 
functions of the Company; (d) Monitor Bristol-Myers’ compliance with applicable federal 
securities laws, and in his quarterly reports make recommendations necessary to ensure 
that the Company complies with applicable federal securities laws. 
The monitor’s power is also significantly bolstered by his authority to make recommendations that 
Bristol-Myers must adopt “unless Bristol-Myers objects to the recommendation and the Office agrees that 
adoption of the recommendation should not be required.” A strong, independent monitor is in a far better 
position to ride herd over a mammoth corporation than any U.S. Attorney’s Office or Probation Office. 
Independent monitors are visible, on-site reminders that compliance with the terms of a deferred 
prosecution agreement is mandatory, not optional. Monitors are able to observe and understand the 
business they oversee, along with its personnel and processes, in ways that federal prosecutors never 
could or should. If the company views their monitor as a force for positive change and not as an unwanted 
burden, all sides benefit. 
The central role of Judge Lacey in ensuring successful adherence to the spirit and letter of the 
deferred prosecution agreement by no means ends the role of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in this matter. The 
agreement makes it clear that all participants—Bristol-Myers, the independent monitor, and the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office—should treat the agreement as an opportunity to work together toward the common aim 
of making Bristol-Myers a model corporate citizen. The agreement provides for regular communication 
among the parties, requiring Bristol-Myers’ CEO, non-executive chairman, and general counsel to meet 
quarterly with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the monitor. [¶13]  The quarterly meetings are an opportunity 
to discuss the monitor’s quarterly reports and any other issues and concerns that may arise, to keep the 
lines of communication open, and to remind all of the importance of compliance with the agreement and the 
serious consequences breach of the agreement would have for the company, its shareholders, and 
employees. 
The regular quarterly meetings have already proven to be useful and interesting. Prior to each 
meeting, we are provided with a 400-500 page quarterly progress report by the independent monitor. The 
report provides updates on Bristol-Myers’ business operations, new legal issues arising in any of its 
operating entities, compliance with the deferred prosecution agreement, and a forward-looking section on 
issues Bristol-Myers will confront in the next quarter. We also exchange draft agendas prior to meeting so 
that all topics of interest to both parties are addressed. The attendees at the meeting include the non-
executive chairman, the chief executive officer, the general counsel, the U.S. Attorney, his counsel, and the 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys who prosecuted the matter. The independent monitor presides at the meeting. To 
further emphasize the post-deferred prosecution agreement sense of partnership between the parties, the 
site of the meeting is alternated between our offices and [those of] Bristol-Myers. . . . 
In addition, to impress upon Bristol-Myers’ top managers and finance personnel the seriousness of 
the company’s situation, the deferred prosecution agreement also provides [in ¶22] for “a meeting . . . of its 
senior executives and any senior financial personnel, and any other Bristol-Myers employees who the 
Company desires to attend, such meeting to be attended by the United States Attorney and other 
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representatives of the Office for the purpose of communicating the goals and expected effect of this 
Agreement.” . . .   
The deferred prosecution agreement recognized that Bristol-Myers had taken steps to change its 
budget process, to assure that appropriate consideration is given to input and analysis from the bottom to 
top, and not exclusively from top to bottom, and to adequately document that process. The agreement 
requires that Bristol-Myers management keep informed about its budget process and the perils of top-down 
budgeting, but does leave budgeting to Bristol-Myers management. [The DPA at ¶24] provides for high-
level reporting on issues that will reflect whether the old culture of hitting the numbers at all costs still 
lingers. It provides as follows:  
The CEO and CFO shall prepare and submit to the Non-Executive Chairman, Chief 
Compliance Officer and the Monitor described in paragraph 11 written reports on the 
following subjects: (a) all non-standard transactions with major U.S. wholesalers, such 
written report to be submitted within fifteen (15) days of such transaction; (b) an overview 
and analysis of Bristol-Myers’ annual budget process for its major business units, including 
description of significant instances of any top-down changes to business unit submissions, 
such written report to be submitted together with the proposed budget submitted for 
approval to the Board of directors; (c) sales and earnings forecasts or projections at the 
corporate or major business unit level which indicate a quarterly target will not be met, 
together with a description of steps subsequently taken, if any, to achieve the budget 
target, such written report to be submitted quarterly and at least ten (10) business days 
prior to the Company’s scheduled quarterly analyst call; (d) description of significant 
instances in which the preliminary quarterly closing of the books of any major business unit 
indicated that the business unit would not meet its budget target for any sales or earnings 
measure. 
The agreement [¶18] also requires Bristol-Myers to develop and implement a “training and 
education program, which shall be reviewed and approved by the board of directors, designed to advance 
and underscore the Company’s commitment to exemplary corporate citizenship, to best practices of 
effective corporate governance and the highest principles of integrity and professionalism, and to fostering 
a culture of openness, accountability and compliance throughout the Company.” . . .  
Many of the remedial measures in the deferred prosecution agreement—the top-level structural 
and governance changes, the reporting by senior management, and the training and education programs 
for key financial and legal personnel—are designed to spread knowledge and responsibility for doing the 
right thing throughout the Bristol-Myers organization. 
[The following paragraph appeared as footnote 29 in the article, addressing ¶29 of the DPA.] 
Another step taken by Bristol-Myers to try to change the corporate culture was the endowment of a chair in 
business ethics at Seton Hall University School of Law. The professor occupying that endowed chair is 
required to conduct an annual ethics seminar for Bristol-Myers management and other interested industry 
members. The idea for endowing the chair originated with counsel for Bristol-Myers. The only requirement 
from our Office was that the chair was endowed at a New Jersey law school. Rutgers University School of 
Law already had a chair in business ethics endowed by Prudential. Bristol-Myers, after the signing of the 
deferred prosecution agreement, entered into discussions with the Dean of Seton Hall Law School and 
formally endowed the chair in December 2005. 
  
 
